Measuring the Potential to Adopt Self Governance for the Management of a Common Pool Resource by Colin Castillo, Sergio
  
 
 
MEASURING THE POTENTIAL TO ADOPT SELF GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF A COMMON POOL RESOURCE  
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
SERGIO COLIN CASTILLO  
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
December 2011 
 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring the Potential to Adopt Self Governance 
for the Management of a Common Pool Resource 
Copyright 2011 Sergio Colin Castillo  
  
 
 
MEASURING THE POTENTIAL TO ADOPT SELF GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF A COMMON POOL RESOURCE  
 
A Dissertation 
by 
SERGIO COLIN CASTILLO  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  Richard T. Woodward 
Committee Members, Bruce A. McCarl 
 James W. Mjelde 
 Frances P. Gelwick 
Head of Department, John P. Nichols 
 
December 2011 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Measuring the Potential to Adopt Self Governance  
for the Management of a Common Pool Resource. (December 2011) 
Sergio Colin Castillo, B.S., Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, México; 
M.S., El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, México 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard T. Woodward 
 
Self governance has proved to be a suitable instrument for the management of a 
common pool resource like fisheries. Under self governance, individuals organize 
themselves for the use of a resource, to deal with problems derived from the free access: 
overexploitation and low profit levels. Although there is a large amount of research 
devoted to investigate the common pool resources and self governance, there are two 
areas that represent a gap in the current research. One, what are the main variables 
related to likely self governance adoption? Two, how is the potential for self governance 
related to the economic efficiency of the resource users?  
Unlike most of previous research that involves ex-post analysis, this is an ex-ante 
assessment of the potential for self governance for management of a common pool 
resource: a small-scale fishery located in Mexico. This research hypothesizes a positive 
relationship between fisher‟s technical efficiency and the likely adoption of self 
governance for the management of the fishery.  
 iv 
Taking a set of theoretical conditions, this research assesses the fishers‟ 
perception on the adoption of self governance. Further, a stochastic frontier analysis is 
applied to estimate the technical efficiency of each fisher. Finally, a relationship between 
the potential for self governance with technical efficiency, revenue, and other variables 
such as education and fisher experience is explored. The results show no significant 
effect of technical efficiency and revenue on the potential for self governance, as well a 
weak positive effect of fisher experience on the likelihood for self governance adoption. 
The findings of this research may be useful to improve the efficiency of the fishing 
activity and encourage the adoption of self governance in the study site.  
The method proposed in this research is based on attitudes of the fishers, and it 
represents a step toward understanding apriori whether self governance would be 
implementable or not. Thus, as an ex-ante assessment, it is hoped to help predicting 
individual‟s behavior to deal with the overexploitation and low income levels derived 
from the use of a common pool resource.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation, objectives and hypothesis 
This dissertation addresses the problem of managing a resource where a large 
number of people have unlimited access, common-pool resource (CPR). In our case, the 
resource is a lake that suffers from over-extraction and a poor profitability level of the 
commercial fishers. This situation is common in CPRs, and Gordon (1954) characterized 
it as the fisheries problem. Each fisher or CPR user (from here on these two terms will 
be synonymous) may know that to avoid the fisheries problem, the harvest must be 
reduced and a fishery management need to be implementing. But at the same time, each 
fisher faces a dilemma: if limit his own catch and other fishers do not, the fisheries 
problem will be worst meaning a loss for everybody, and especially for those who did 
sacrifice. Gordon (1954) and Demsetz (1967) described this problem and Hardin (1968) 
reformulated the idea positing that human groups cannot solve this problem because of 
the selfish behavior; in his view, we are trapped in a tragedy of the commons.  
Previous research has established the theoretical background to analyze the 
fisheries problem, reformulating to cover other resources like forest, grazing lands, 
marine areas, etc. and named as the CPR problem (Ostrom 1990).  
1 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the International Journal of the Commons. 
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Through the years, and especially since Ostrom (1990), new ideas and methods 
have been developed to study the CPR problem. Although, most of the empirical 
research has focused on the ex-post analysis seeking to explain the ways that groups 
organize to face the CPR problem.  
Based on a theoretical framework proposed by Ostrom (1990), the main 
objective of this thesis is to analyze the potential for self governance as a way to deal 
with the CPR problem. Under self governance, individuals organize to set and enforce 
rules for the use of the CPR. We explore the self governance management (SGM) for a 
CPR, a small-scale fishery in Mexico. The research has three particular objectives. (1) 
Investigate the perception of a fishers‟ group, on their predisposition toward SGM. 
(2) Measure the technical efficiency (TE) of the fishers in the same small-scale fishery. 
(3) Explore the relationship between the fishers‟ propensity to adopt SGM, as evaluated 
using Ostrom‟s conditions, and the fishers‟ TE in this small-scale fishery. 
The main research questions are. How can we assess the likelihood of a 
successful adoption of self governance? What is the role of users‟ TE on the self 
governance adoption? Ideally, it would be good to answer these questions before 
embarking on the encouragement of self governance. Knowing the predisposition of the 
CPR users may save resources and improve the decision making process.  
With this research we identify three contributions to the literature. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first ex-ante assessment of the likelihood of SGM 
success. Second, by including a measure of efficiency at user level, the TE, we relate the 
significance of economic behavior with the potential for the adoption of self governance. 
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To do this we hypothesize a positive relationship between TE and the predisposition of 
fishers to adopt SGM. Economic models often assume all economic agents to be 
homogeneous and fully efficient. We relax this assumption, and study producer 
efficiency as a factor that explains the user‟s predisposition towards the adoption of self 
governance. Finally, this study offers insights about whether or not a change in 
governance is feasible and desirable.  
Overall, this is an ex-ante assessment that brings information useful for decision 
makers to decide, for example, between continuing with the management implemented 
by the government (status quo) or promoting self governance. Further, evaluating the 
potential for SGM may offer guidance as to how to remedy the low profit levels and 
overexploitation accrue to the use of the CPR, and help to define strategies for the 
assistance of the fishing communities. 
In addition to this introductory chapter, the data section and a conclusion, this 
dissertation is presented in three main chapters. In Chapter III we used the Ostrom 
conditions to evaluate the potential for SGM. In Chapter IV the TE was estimated, 
finding the most relevant variables that explain the efficiency of the fishers. In Chapter 
V the relationship between the fishers‟ the fishers‟ predisposition toward a system of self 
governance and their TE and other socioeconomic variables is modeled. 
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CHAPTER II 
SURVEY, DATA, STUDY SITE 
Study site  
The study site is the Lázaro Cárdenas Reservoir (LCR). The LCR is in the 
municipality of Inde, Durango, a poor and arid region, located in the upper watershed of 
the Nazas River, best known as “La Laguna”, a region located at the north-central part of 
Mexico. LCR has a storage capacity of 3,336 million m
3
 of water on 15,000 hectares 
(INEGI 2005). Three fishing communities are situated on the banks of the reservoir: El 
Palmito, Las Delicias, and La Victoria. The fishers are not the legal owners of the 
reservoir, but they enjoy unlimited access. These communities are largely dependent on 
fishing, supplemented by minimal agriculture-livestock activities and remittances from 
U.S. emigrants. The biggest community is Las Delicias and the smallest is La Victoria. 
These two communities have developed agriculture and livestock activities while El 
Palmito community depends almost entirely on fishing. In El Palmito fishers have higher 
revenue, spend more time fishing, have more experience, and have higher catch. El 
Palmito may be the more affected if any change in the fishery management is 
implemented. Recreational fishing is infrequent, but increasing, although this activity 
provides little benefits to commercial fishers.
1
 
The LCR fishing fleet is composed of small fiberglass boats with outboard 
motors; although a few fishers do not use motor and row their boats (Tovar et al. 2009). 
                                                 
1
  Development of recreational activities requires the coordination of fishers. By reasons of competing 
technologies (hand lines vs. nets), recreational and commercial fishing cannot operate simultaneously. 
 5 
Most of the fishers use gill nets, but a few use angling gear (hook and line). Some fishers 
share boats to split the operation costs. The fisher group is exclusively formed by men. 
An average fisher is an individual between 40 and 50 years old, with elementary school 
education level, living in a family of 4 individuals or more. Most fishers use an old boat 
and an old engine and work every day of the week.  
 As it was detected in the survey, most of the fishers agree that fishery is in a 
critical condition because they have very low profits and catch small individuals. 
Government rules allow fishers to use a gill net with mesh openings of 4 inches; 
however the use of smaller mesh sizes is common. The result is the declining harvest 
and size of the fish (Tovar et al. 2009). From 1983 to 1992, fish production was about 
1,000 tons/year (71 kg/ha/yr), with a maximum yield of 1,200 tons/year (FAO 1996). 
According with the interviews to leaders and fishers, the number of fishers using the 
LCR varied from 204 in 1992 to 134 in 2007. At the time of the survey, 148 fishers were 
found registered in the three cooperatives, although it is generally believed that only 
about 100 are active fishers. Based on informal agreements, each cooperative has an area 
to fish. The harvested species are Micropterus salmoides (lobina or largemouth bass), 
Ictalurus punctatus (bagre or channel catfish), Cyprinus carpio (common carp), 
Oreochromis aureus (blue tilapia) and Pomoxis annularis (robaleta or white crappie) and 
Lepomis macrochirus (mojarra or bluegill). 
 In general, weak regulation in the LCR fishery has been observed. The municipal 
government and CONAPESCA, the federal agency, exhibit a lack of personnel and 
limited budgetary resources that restrict management efforts. As a result, there is very 
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limited monitoring and enforcement of existing regulations. Agency decisions lack 
scientific criteria for seasonal closures, fish stocking, and gear restrictions in LCR 
(Tovar et al. 2009). This situation is not unique to LCR, it is representative of most of 
the inland fisheries of Mexico. Based on Salas et al. (2007) and Andrew et al. (2007); 
this case may be also representative of other inland small-scale fisheries of other 
developing countries. Overall, this description suggests that commercial fishery has 
overharvested the resource and used it in an inefficient way, a typical case of an open 
access fisheries as described by Gordon (1954). 
Data  
The data were gathered from a survey on LCR. The survey was administered in 
the summer of 2010. From a total of 148 fishers in the 3 communities, 111 completed 
surveys were obtained. The instrument was pretested using two focus groups, one with 
students of Universidad Juarez of Durango and the other with fishers of Francisco Zarco, 
another small lake in the region. Recently graduated biology students were hired as 
enumerators to conduct most of the surveys. Many of the fishers cannot read, so the 
enumerators read the questions directly to the fishers. To increase the response rate, each 
fisher received a compensation of 50 Mexican pesos (about 4 US dollars) and a prize 
which was from a random drawing at the end of the survey.  
The questionnaire was divided in three sections. The first one captures data 
related to production and the socioeconomic state of the fishery. The second section 
capturers the data related to self governance. The third section captures the data related 
to the income of the fisher.  
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The average fisher is 45 years old, had six years of schooling, lives in a family of 
five people, and has three dependents. Each fisher uses an average of seven nets, work 
six days per week and his boat and engine have more than 10 years of use. Fishers use 
small fiberglass boats of 4.3 meters long on average, with an outboard motor of 20 horse 
power average. About a half of the fishers share a boat with other fisher. The average 
number of years working as a fisher is 24.  As compared to the neighborhood, less than 
50% of the fishers have never worked for the cooperative administration neither 
participates in the conservation activities of the lake. Table A.1 of Appendix A describes 
the complete set of production and socioeconomic variables. 
In the data used to assess the potential for self governance, the questions were 
designed to describe the conditions for a likely adoption of self governance. Three sets 
of questions were formulated. Indirect positive and indirect negative questions designed 
to test reliability. Direct questions designed to test validity. In this section of the 
questionnaire, all the questions have answers on a Likert scale of 1 to 5. These data are 
described in full in the Chapter II. 
More than 50% of the fishers depend primarily on the fishing activity. Although, 
the revenue derived from the fishing activity is very low, 500 to 600 pesos per week 
(about 50 US dollars). About a third of the fishers obtain remittances from relatives 
living in the US. Income from non fishing activities is important, especially during the 
season closed to fishing, as 33% of the fishers do not have any other source of income, 
36% complement their income with agriculture and livestock activities and, and only 4% 
have another business activity. 
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CHAPTER III 
EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL OF SELF GOVERNANCE IN THE FISHERY 
Introduction 
Common pool resources (CPRs) like fisheries, forest, marine areas, lakes or open 
grazing lands, are resources available to more than one person. These resources suffer 
problems associated with the unlimited access like overuse, resulting in degradation and 
poor economic performance. This is called the CPR problem. Hardin‟s (1958) “Tragedy 
of the Commons” paper describes this problem stating that users of the CPR will not 
manage the resource in common nor take into account the consequences of his actions 
on other users. Contrary to Hardin, however, there has been steadily growing interest 
and use of the common management approach to deal with the CPR problem. Such 
common management, best known as self governance,
2
 involves user groups taking 
control of the CPR and overcoming the incentive problems that plague CPRs. Under self 
governance, individuals can achieve benefits derived from common work that improve 
the economic viability of the CPR (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2003).  
This chapter focuses on self governance for the management (SGM) of a fishery 
as a way to solve the CPR problem. Fishery management is an issue that researchers and 
policy makers have devoted considerable attention. Instruments for resource regulation 
have become more sophisticated and extensive over time. Besides policies like 
individual transferable quotas, fees, taxes, and protected areas; self governance is now 
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  Governance is the exercise of policy definition to assure rules to manage the resource. Thus, in self 
governance the resource users themselves have the decision-making responsibility on defining such rules. 
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recognized as a viable tool for fishery management (Grafton et al. 2008, 2006; Hilborn 
2007b; Degnbol et al. 2006; Panayotou 1998). These policies are not mutually exclusive, 
but can be combined depending upon the conditions of the fishery (Tietenberg 2003; 
Hughey et al. 2000; Yang et al. 2009).  
“Successful” cases of self governance have been documented around the world 
(see Townsend and Sutton 2008; Ostrom 1990), suggesting SGM is a suitable option to 
manage CPR. Self governance systems are successful if the institution allows CPR users 
to develop solutions by themselves, aligning extraction rates with resource productivity 
to achieve a common benefit, and overcoming the problems of free riders and 
opportunistic behavior (Ostrom 2005, 1990).  
Empirical evidence is essential to the development of our understanding of self 
governance and the CPR problem. The study of these cases has been useful to derive the 
characteristics of successful
3
 cases. Nonetheless, the ability to predict a successful 
adoption of SGM is still limited. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has 
attempted to conduct an ex ante assessment of the likelihood of adoption SGM. Carrying 
out such an evaluation is the principle objective of this chapter. 
Adopting self governance can be difficult. Excluding individuals from the use of 
the CPR can be complicated and costly; incentives for free riders and opportunistic 
behavior will always exist. If not all the CPR users are successful in adopting self 
governance; what characteristics do we need to check ex-ante to know the potential for 
                                                 
3
  A successful SGM can exclude external users, adapt management rules to local conditions, allow most 
users to participate in the decision-making process, is recognized by other authorities and have an effective 
monitoring, graduated sanctions, and cheap-easy mechanisms of conflict resolution (Ostrom, 1990). 
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SGM? The approach taken here is to evaluate the prospects for SGM before it has been 
implemented by looking at the predispositions of the CPR users (i.e. the fishers). This 
study fills a gap in the literature, offering insights about how to predict whether a change 
in governance of the CPR is feasible and desirable. Such ex-ante assessments would 
provide valuable information for policy makers to define strategies to use to assist the 
fishing communities. 
Built on the institutional analysis proposed by Ostrom (1990), we assess the 
perception of the fishers in a small-scale fishery as to whether SGM can be implemented 
to manage the resource on which their livelihoods depend. Distinct from most of the 
previous empirical analysis in the area, which are ex-post in nature (study cases after 
SGM has been installed), this is an ex-ante assessment to explore the potential for SGM. 
We propose an approach for carrying out this assessment and implement it at LCR, an 
overharvested small-scale fishery of Mexico.  
Knowing ex-ante the likelihood for self governance may save resources and 
direct the effort to an efficient management of the CPR. Governments or private entities 
spend a lot of effort and scarce resources to regulate environmental issues, and in many 
cases the implementation of policies is not effective. For example, while public sector in 
OECD countries spent 0.7% of GDP from 1990 to 2004 for pollution abatement and 
control, the governmental offices have struggled to regulate the commons (Townsend 
1995; Ostrom 2003). Indeed, fisheries have a long history of overexploitation, marine 
biodiversity loss is increasingly impairing the ocean's capacity to provide food, preserve 
water quality and recover from perturbations (Worm et al. 2009, 2006).  
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The chapter is divided as follows. First, it presents a literature review of the self 
governance and CPR problem. Second, a modeling approach is proposed. Next, the 
survey and data aggregation is described and a discussion about validity and reliability 
comprises most of the subsection. The results and discussion are accompanied with 
remarks of descriptive statistics. Finally a set of conclusions is presented. 
Literature review 
This section gives a broad overview of literature on self governance as a way to 
solve the CPR problem, focusing in the question of what conditions favor the adoption 
of SGM in fisheries.  
Fisheries problem and the effective governance 
Papers have documented that fisheries activity is facing global challenges 
(Hilborn 2007a; Worm et al. 2006, 2009; Grafton et al. 2006; Salas et al. 2007; Andrew 
et al. 2007). As was discussed by Grafton et al. (2006), several factors may lead to a 
decline in fisheries including inappropriate incentives, high demand for limited 
resources, poverty, inadequate knowledge, ineffective governance, interaction among 
fishers sectors, and other aspects of the environment. Here we focus on two problems, 
the existence of inappropriate incentives and ineffective governance.  
With regard to the existence of inappropriate incentives, we mean that policies 
are sometimes poorly designed or inefficiently adopted. Market options like protected 
areas, fees, taxes, and individual transferable quotas need to be adjusted to the site 
conditions (Panayotou 1998; Tietenberg 2003; Degnbol et al. 2006). These policies may, 
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however, require specialized studies. Cases have been identified where species-based 
management by governmental agencies has failed to stop the fisheries decline (Grafton 
et al. 2006, 2008; Hilborn 2007b; Ostrom 1990, 2005). And there is a consensus on the 
need of effective governance for the fisheries management. By governance, we refer to 
the exercise of rules and norms (understandings) to influence the behavior of resource 
users (Stiftung 2009; Sissenwine and Mace 2003; World Bank 1991).  
Overall, neither the market approach nor state institutions alone have been 
universally successful in achieving sustainable long term productive use of fisheries 
(Degnbol et al. 2006; Grafton et al. 2006).  Institutions are rarely entirely private market 
based or public government based; they are a mixture of private and public institutions 
that vary from case to case (Ostrom 1990, 2005).  
A claim from previous findings and used in this research is that improvements in 
fisheries should align the fishers‟ incentives with social targets and ecosystem health 
(Hilborn 2007a; Degnbol et al. 2006; Grafton et al. 2006, 2008). The key point is that 
institutions often fail in this regard because they ignore endogenous institutions and 
recommend either coercion or privatization of resources to achieve policy targets (Sarker 
and Itoh 2003). While community-based management has been argued as the best way to 
rebuild and recover the small-scale fisheries (Worm et al. 2009). In SGM, fishers 
themselves have the decision-making responsibility. The advantage is that when 
successful, SGM reduces management costs and increases the certainty and legitimacy 
of the users‟ decisions (Ostrom 1990).  
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How to achieve common management of a CPR? 
Various related models have sought to explain the CPR problem and describe 
how difficult it can be for individuals to reach collective benefits. We describe three 
models used extensively in previous research. The first model, the “tragedy of the 
commons” by Hardin (1968), is probably the most famous argument against common 
management. Hardin posits that individual‟s interests goes in opposite direction of the 
group or community interests. When this happens, individual‟s interest will work against 
SGM and overexploitation will be unavoidable. Gordon (1954) and other scholars stated 
similar arguments describing how a diverse set of resources can be overexploited (Llyod 
1977; Dales 1968; Clark 1976, 1980; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Norman 1984; 
Thompson 1977; Wilson 1985). For Gordon, the CPR is “anybody‟s property,” to a 
source of wealth that is free for all but valued by no one. As consequence, the proper 
time to use it is now, before others use it. This argument has been used for years by 
economists to explain the overuse of the fisheries and the low profits of the fishers. 
The second model to represent the challenge on the management of the CPR is 
the Prisoner‟s Dilemma game. This can be thought of as a general formalization of 
Hardin and Gordon models to explain the CPR problem as a non cooperative where all 
players have complete information of the outputs, but the agreements among players are 
not binding while communication is forbidden or impossible (Dawes 1975; Ostrom 
1990).
4
 In a two player‟s game, the dominant strategy is to defect, rather than cooperate, 
i.e. take care of one‟s self. But if both players choose to defect, the resulting equilibrium 
                                                 
4
  You can find a good description of this game in Mas-Colell, Winston, and Green (1995). 
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leads to lower payoffs for both. In short, a rational individual strategy may lead to 
collectively irrational outcomes (Ostrom 1990; Campbell 1985).  
The third model that explains the dynamic process by which individuals pursue a 
collective outcome is the called the logic of collective action (Olson 1965). This model 
considers group and individual welfare gains. Individuals may support the actions 
towards a common interest if they will be better off. This logical premise of having self 
interested and rational behavior of individuals to achieve their objectives would be 
sufficient to generate a collective action, though Olson wrote against such logic. He 
argued that rational self interested individuals will not act to achieve the common 
interest unless there is coercion or the number of individuals is very small.
5
 This model 
challenged the optimism of theorists who favor the idea that individuals with common 
interest will pursue a possible benefit for their group (Ostrom 1990). 
Overall, these three models capture the essence of the CPR problem: how free 
riders and opportunistic behavior presents large challenges for the management of 
natural resources that are classified as open access (Ostrom 2005; 1990). They are the 
basis for the empirical analysis carried out by Ostrom and scholars of the institutional 
change school.  
Self governance: Importance, principles and complications 
The literature about how common management can overcome the challenges of 
CPR management is most closely associated with the work of Ostrom (1990). She 
describes the principles of self governance and related complications that can arise. She 
                                                 
5
  Another issue was opened by defining the size of the groups and what is “very small.” 
 15 
stated eight design-principles that characterize the configuration of rules devised and 
used by “robust,” or long-enduring and stable, CPR institutions:  
(1) Clearly defined boundaries that allow the exclusion of external users;  
(2) Rules for the CPR use adapted to local conditions;  
(3) Collective arrangements that let most users take part in the decision-making process;  
(4) Effective monitoring under responsibility of the local users;  
(5) A scale of graduated sanctions for users who violate community rules; 
(6) Cheap and easy mechanisms of conflict resolution;  
(7) Community self-determination that is recognized by higher-level authorities; and  
(8) In larger CPRs, an organization in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, 
with small local CPRs at the base level.  
These design principles have been used to carry out ex post analysis of how 
robust (long-enduring and stable) are the local institutions managing the CPR (Gautam 
and Shivakoti 2005).  
A related framework for ex post analysis of CPR management systems has been 
put forth by scholars of institutional change school who have integrated Ostrom‟s eight 
design-principles in the Social Ecological Systems (SES) framework (Anderies et al. 
2004; Ostrom 2007; Basurto 2008). The SES framework considers the interaction of 
governance, resource, and users systems to assess the “robustness,” or how well the 
decision making process is supported. Berkes and Seixas (2005) used the SES 
framework to assess the resilience of the human and nature systems. A SES can be 
defined as a bio-geo-physical unit and its associated social actors and institutions. SESs 
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are complex, adaptive and delimited by functional boundaries surrounding particular 
ecosystems and their problem context (Anderies et al. 2004). In a SES, it is necessary to 
describe the structure and dynamics of the relations between the system‟s elements, 
requiring a trans-disciplinary research to fit an adequate problem orientation and 
integrative results (Hirsch-Hadorn et al. 2008). The dynamics of the ecological and 
social systems whenever have been hard to address (Anderies et al. 2004).  
Beyond the framework noted above, scholars have identified other specific 
factors that may influence the management of the CPR.  Hackett, Schlager, and Walker 
(1994) have shown how a heterogeneous endowment creates a distributional conflict 
over access to CPR that may cause an SGM system to fail. Basurto (2005, 2008) 
discussed how community characteristics may help to mediate the conflict between 
collective action for the access and use of a fishery in Mexico. The size of the CPR is 
another characteristic that matters – as the size of the CPR decreases; the easier it may 
be to manage the CPR (Ostrom 1990, 2009; Berkes 2006). Another factor influencing 
the SGM adoption is the transaction costs. Townsend (2010) describes how high 
transaction costs have been an obstacle to self governance in the New Zealand fisheries.  
As can be seen, there is an extensive and varied research on CPR management. 
However, there has been limited the work to empirically evaluate whether the conditions 
for the adoption of SGM are present in advance of attempts to put such a system in 
place. Fortunately, the theoretical underpinnings of such analysis do exist.  
 17 
Predicting the likely adoption of SGM: The Ostrom conditions  
Ostrom proposed six conditions (Figure 3.1) that she believed determine the 
likelihood of users to adopt changes in the use of the CPR in favor of SGM. For 
identification purposes, from here to the end of this dissertation, we call these the 
Ostrom Conditions (OCs). 
 
…the likelihood of users to adopt rule changes for the CPR use will be 
feasible if… 
(1) „Most users‟ conclude they will be harmed if they don‟t adopt alternative rules 
(2) „Most users‟ conclude they will be affected similarly by the alternative rules 
(3) „Most users‟ highly value continuing the activity 
(4) Users share norms of reciprocity and trust 
(5) Users face low cost of information, transformation and enforcement 
(6) Users group is small and stable 
(Ostrom 1990, 211) 
Figure 3.1: Six Ostrom conditions to predict the likely adoption of rules on a common pool 
resource. 
 
An assessment of the six OCs must account for the influence of the external 
political regime. The political regime may influence how and when the individuals use 
the CPR (Ostrom 1990). When the pressure of political regime is essentially nonexistent, 
Ostrom (1990) calls the situation a “zero condition.”  The zero condition may exist if the 
CPR is in a remote location and/or users face indifference from the political regime, such 
that the regime has a minimum effect on internal choices. When the de facto conditions 
are such that the zero condition holds, the analysis is simplified since it avoids external 
distortions on the assessment of the OCs. According with the description presented in 
Chapter I, this research assumes that zero condition holds in the study site. 
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It is important to distinguish these six OCs from the eight design principles 
mentioned earlier. The main difference is that design principles are ex-post and are used 
to frame a systematic evaluation of cases in place. The six OCs offer a framework for ex-
ante analysis since they reflect the potential of CPR users to adopt changes in the rules 
for management of the resource.  
Predicting a likely adoption of SGM: Other approaches  
Before explaining how we will use the OCs to carry out our analysis, we will 
mention that two alternative frameworks for carrying out an ex ante assessment of the 
potential for SGM have been proposed.  In the first one, Ostrom (1999, 2009) proposed 
the use of cost benefit analysis (CBA) to assess how easy it is for CPR users to adopt 
SGM. The second approach has been derived from the SES framework. 
The principle behind the CBA approach is that CPR users are expected to favor 
SGM if the expected benefits are greater than the cost. Unfortunately, if the specific 
rules to be implemented are not clearly defined, CBA may not be a good approach. CBA 
would be inaccurate if the CPR users place more weight on the costs, which are probably 
quite tangible, than the probable benefits, which are more speculative (Ostrom 1999). 
Moreover, the data to measure the benefits is hard to obtain.  
In the second approach, two papers that have proposed the use of SES framework 
to analyze how easily SGM can be adopted. Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) suggest 
five characteristics for an easy achievement of common governance (Figure 3.2, 2
nd
 
column). Ostrom (2009) proposed ten second-level variables (Figure 3.2, 3
rd
 column) to 
identify their positive or negative effect on the likelihood of users to engage in SGM.  
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There are similarities and discrepancies between the criteria used in previous 
research (2
nd
 and 3
rd
 columns in Figure 3.2) and the one used in this research (1
st
 column 
in Figure 3.2). On the similarities, the relevance of reciprocity and trust in these three 
approaches is clear, though less explicit in the third column as social capital and 
collective-choice rules. The second similar point is that all frameworks refer to the low 
cost of monitoring and enforcement, characteristics reemphasized in the second column 
and not clearly identified in Ostrom (2009). Third, all three refer to the size and stability 
of the users group; more stable and small user groups are more likely to adopt SGM.  
 
Ostrom (1990) Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) Ostrom (2009) 
(1) „most users‟ conclude that they 
will be harmed if they do not adopt 
new rules  
(2) „most users‟ conclude that they 
will be affected in a similar way by 
the new rules  
(3) „most users‟ highly value 
continuing the activity  
(4) users share generalized norms of 
reciprocity and trust  
(5) users face low monitoring and 
enforcement cost  
(6) users are a small and stable group 
(1) low monitoring cost;  
(2) changes in resource 
technology, population, and 
socio economic conditions take 
place at moderate rates  
(3) users have direct and 
frequent communications and 
trust each other  
(4) outsiders can be excluded at 
low cost 
(5) users themselves can monitor 
and enforce their collective 
agreements 
(1) size of resource system 
(2) productivity of system  
(3) predictability of system 
dynamics  
(4) resource unit mobility  
(5) number of users  
(6) leadership  
(7) norms/social capital  
(8) knowledge of the SES  
(9) importance of resource 
to the users  
(10) collective-choice rules 
Figure 3.2: Proposed characteristics to analyze the potential adoption of self governance. 
 
The main difference between the three frameworks in Figure 3.2 is that Ostrom 
(1990) conditions focus on users‟ opinions to predict a change in the use of the CPR, 
whereas Dietz et al. (2003) and Ostrom (2009) focus on the relationships among systems 
(users, resource and institutions). Additionally, it looks that Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 
(2003) proposed characteristics do not includes the predictability of the system dynamics 
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(probable output and rules effects) neither on the value of the activity-resource to the 
users. Ostrom (2009) as well, excludes the monitoring and enforcement costs but 
includes other characteristics such as leadership and knowledge of the system. Overall, 
2
nd
 and 3
rd
 columns of Figure 3.2 analyze the interaction between systems rather than 
focusing on the users‟ predisposition to adopt SGM. While all three approaches offer 
insights, we adopted the OC approach because it can be carried out based on the opinion 
of the fishers gathered through surveys; therefore it is less likely to be based on the 
subjective interpretation of an analyst carrying out the assessment. 
Finally, we should note that recently experimental economics methods have been 
used to explore trust and cooperation issues among the CPR users (Cardenas and 
Carpenter 2008). Experimental economics has potential for gathering insights on some 
dimensions of the barriers confronting SGM.  Such analyses need to be well suited in a 
comprehensive model, including all six OCs, to predict the likely adoption of SGM.  
Wrapping up, the research on CPR problems has been extensive. There is 
empirical evidence on what conditions favor SGM and a better understanding of the 
characteristics and complications confronting successful cases. Through the years, new 
ideas and methods have been developed on these matters, though most of the empirical 
research has focused on the ex-post analysis rather than the ex-ante potential for self 
governance. In the next section, we develop the approach used to evaluate ex-ante the 
potential for SGM in the fishery. 
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Modeling approach 
The model used in this chapter is based on the six conditions identified by 
Ostrom (1990) presented in Figure 3.1. Ostrom‟s basic proposition is that the probability 
of a community successfully adopting SGM is a function of the six conditions over all 
the fishers‟ communities. Each of the OCs, however, is actually a function of the 
perspectives of the fishers that make up the community.  Thus, the i
th
 condition (OCi) is 
considered an aggregation of the form.   
)..,,,( 21 niiiii OCOCOCgOC         (2.1) 
where OCi
j
 is the i
th
 OC for the j
th 
fisher, j=1,…, n. The challenge for ex-ante evaluation 
is that neither OCi nor OCi
j
 can be directly observed. Consequently, the first question 
that must be answered is how to assess the preferences for a likely adoption of the self 
governance? Since neither OCi nor OCi
j
 can be observed, a series of questions were 
developed that were assumed to be correlated with OCi
j
. These questions were then 
asked in a survey. The answers to the questions were used to create an index,
j
iOC

, that 
is a function of the responses to the questions,   
),..,,( 21
^
m
ijijiji
j
i qqqhOC         (2.2) 
where 
k
ijq  represents the j
th
 fisher‟s response to the kth question, k=1,…, m, for the ith OC. 
This process is repeated with different set of questions for each condition. 
To arrive at a good set of questions, each OCi was expressed in slightly different 
language that could be used in the survey. This language adjustment is important for two 
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reasons. First, we need to adjust each condition to the language of the fishery. Second, 
since in our case study, the education level of the fishers is low, and we need a “working 
concept” to guide development of questions in words easily to understand by the fishers. 
Overall, the adjustment helped us identify the elements of each OCi. The process is 
explained below in the section named “the questionnaire.”  
Finally, the answers gathered from the questions were aggregated in the resulting 
index
j
iOC

. This index is a measure of the true but unobserved j
iOC . The process to 
obtain the index is presented below in the section named “data aggregation.”  
Data 
As discussed in Chapter II, the data were gathered from a survey on the Lázaro 
Cárdenas Reservoir (LCR). Here, we focus on the questions that are specifically made to 
assess the predisposition of the fishers to adopt SGM.  From a total of 148 fishers in 
three communities, 111 usable surveys were obtained. Three sets of questions were 
formulated, all designed to have a Likert answer: (1) Indirect positive questions ( kiQ ), 
designed to be positively correlated with the corresponding OCi; (2) indirect negative 
questions (- iQ ), designed to be negatively correlated with one specific question of 
k
iQ ; 
and (3) direct questions (DOCi
j
) designed to be positively correlated with OCi. Each 
indirect negative question (- iQ ), is basically a repetition of one question of the set 
k
iQ  
but the answers is adapted so the Likert scale is reversed.  
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The questionnaire 
Formulating the survey, each condition OCi was slightly modified to obtain an 
“operationalizable concept.” This adjustment useful let us to identify elements of each 
OCi and arrive at questions in a language easy to understand by the fishers. Every 
condition has a discussion explaining the changes.  
Each question answer was set up as a Likert scale of 1 to 5. For most of the 
questions, 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. In the middle, the option 3 = 
don‟t know or no change was carefully assessed in the survey and the following strategy 
was used to encourage the respondents to give non-neutral responses. First, the “don‟t 
know” option was not presented to the fisher. Second, only two options were presented 
(e.g. agree or disagree). Third, once the fisher has chosen his option (e.g. agree), he was 
asked for another two options (i.e. agree vs strongly agree). Alternatively, if the fisher 
did not choose any option in the second step, did not agree with the options, or directly 
said that he did not know, the surveyor marked the option 3. This process was designed 
to overcome the neutral responses bias, a frequent problem in Likert answers (Mogey 
1999; Trochim 2006). This effect is also referred to as the central tendency bias, a 
problem that arises when the survey respondents avoid extreme response categories.  
When using Likert scales we also was careful to avoid the acquiescence bias or 
the problem when the respondents are basically agree with every statement and tend to 
appear as a "normal" person. This problem was avoided by designing questions with a 
balanced equal number of positive and negative statements (Carifio and Perla 2007). 
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The last problem to avoid is the social desirability bias. This bias arises when 
individual mark his answers in a socially acceptable fashion or with a favorable or light 
opinion. To avoid this bias, we address several questions for every OCi, the indirect 
positive questions kiQ . By repeating questions around the same topic, it is possible to 
capture a probable contradiction or divergence to a light answer (Carifio and Perla 
2007). This is the reason why is not recommended to use only one question like the 
direct questions DOCi
j
.  
Finally, some questions although have different response categories (e.g. Very 
good = 1, … , Very bad = 5 or Increase = 1, … , Decrease = 5). Nonetheless, they share 
the same scale in that higher numbers indicate greater agreement or inclination towards 
the SGM adoption. Thus, it will make feasible the aggregation of the Likert answers. 
Now reviewing the questions for the OCs; the OC1, “Most users” conclude they 
will be harmed if they do not adopt alternative rules explores the attitudes of the CPR 
users (i.e. fishers) about the consequences of doing nothing to end the current 
management scheme governing the CPR (i.e. their perceived future). Ostrom (1999) 
argues that those whose beliefs are consistent with OC1 heavily weigh negative events in 
their decision making processes.  
We split the condition into three parts. First, in the context of the LCR, perceived 
“harm” can be equated with a loss in harvests. Second, we propose the use of maintain 
instead of “do not adopt;” and third, the use of current instead of “alternative rules.” 
This adjustment leads to the operationalizable version of OC1 and helps us to develop 
questions that are easy to understand by the fishers and uncomplicated to aggregate.  
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The questions used to measure OC1 are presented in Table 3.1. For example, 
question 1 asks about current rules instead of “alternative rules.” As well, the perceived 
harm is translated as an increase/decrease in the catch. The use of “next year” seeks to 
avoid ambiguity on the temporal assessment. Notice that question 1 explores the effect 
of doing nothing to modify the status quo. The last row presents the question adapted to 
have a negative answer. This question was designed to contradict the indirect positive 
question 2. The asterisk (*) in question 1 indicates that the scale was reversed (i.e. 2 was 
converted to 4 and 1 to 5) to have an equivalent direction on the responses. It will make 
possible the aggregation of indirect positive questions 1 and 2.  
Table 3.1: Indirect and direct questions related to Ostrom condition one (OC1). 
Original OC1 “Most users” conclude they will be harmed if they do not adopt alternative rules 
Working 
statement OC1 
“Most fishers” conclude they will lose harvest if they maintain the current rules 
Direct 
question 
DOC1 
1. Fishing will decrease if strict fishing rules are not 
adopted? 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know 
4.Agree,   
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
positive  
kQ1  
1. If the current rules remain for the next year, my catch will      
(*) 
1.Increase,   
2.May be increase 
3.Don‟t know, 
4.May be decrease 
5.Decrease 
2. How much do you agree or disagree with each statement?  
Do you favor the adoption of strict management rules (e.g. 
stop fishing bass) 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4.Agree,   
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
negative 
- 1Q  
3. How much do you agree or disagree with?  
The current fishing rules are very strict 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4.Agree,   
5.Strongly agree 
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The OC2, “Most users” conclude they will be affected similarly by the alternative 
rules. This condition, also explores the expectations of the fishers of LCR. To make OC2 
operational, we modify two parts of the condition. First, we restate “similar affect” as 
management rules will not affect one person more than another (e.g. by losing harvest). 
Second, because alternative rules of self governance are not yet specified, we avoid the 
use of “alternative rules.” Instead we use the phrase a set of rules.  
The adjusted OC2 and the related questions are presented in Table 3.2. Again, 
similar to OC1, the asterisk (*) in question 4.4 indicates that the scale was sorted to have 
equivalent direction responses and then make it possible to aggregate with the rest of the 
answers. Finally, in the last row the indirect negative question was designed to contradict 
the indirect positive question 4.1.  
Table 3.2: Indirect and direct questions related to Ostrom condition two (OC2). 
Original OC2 “Most users” conclude they will be affected similarly by the alternative rules 
Working 
statement OC2 
“Most fishers” agree with rules that affect all fishers similarly 
Direct 
question  
DOC2 
2. How much do you agree with a fishing rule that equally 
affect all fishers? 
1.Strong disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
positive  
kQ2  
4. How much do you agree/disagree with each statement? 
4.1. Most cooperative agreements equally affect all fishers 
4.2. A good set of rules imply hard work of all fishers 
4.3. A good set of rules imply sacrifice from all fishers 
4.4. The cooperation among all fishers is not important  (*) 
1.Strong disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
negative 
- 2Q  
5. How much do you agree/disagree with?  
5.1. Most of the cooperative agreements are made for only 
few fishers 
1.Strong disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
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The OC3, “Most users” highly value continuing the activity. This condition uses 
the fisher‟s perception to evaluate the importance of the activity in the eyes of the fisher. 
To modify OC3 we analyze two parts of the condition. First, “value” can be 
complemented with the benefits derived from the fishery. Second, we extend the 
proposition by adding hence they want continue doing it, to capture the value of 
continuing to fish. Accordingly, the working concept of OC3 and its related questions are 
presented in Table 3.3. Again, the negative question 8.1 was designed to contradict the 
indirect positive question six. 
Table 3.3: Indirect and direct questions related to Ostrom condition three (OC3). 
Original OC3 “Most users” highly value continuing the activity 
Working 
statement OC3 
“Most fishers” highly value the benefits derived from the fishing activity, hence they 
want to continue 
Direct  
question  
DOC3 
3. If someone in your family decides to be a fisher, the 
value for you will be… 
1.Very low,  
2.Low,  
3.Don‟t know 
4.High,  
5.Very high 
Indirect 
positive  
kQ3  
6. All things considered, how satisfied are you working as a 
fisher? 
 
1.Not at all satisfied 
2.No satisfied,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Satisfied,  
5.Very satisfied 
7. How much do you agree/disagree with each statement? 
7.1. I want my sons and grandsons to be fishers 
7.2. I teach my son (or I will teach if I have one) how to 
fish 
7.3. I am very proud of being a fisher 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
negative  
- 3Q  
8. How much do you agree/disagree with? 
8.1. I would like to stop fishing if I find a job with the 
same salary 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
 
The OC4, Users share norms of reciprocity and trust. This condition assesses the 
two critical concepts of the condition: reciprocity and trust as they are perceived by the 
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fishers. To modify OC4 we examine the two parts. First, “reciprocity” was considered to 
be synonymous with cooperative behavior, so “reciprocity” is replaced by cooperative 
behavior among the fishers. The resulting OC4 working statement and the direct and 
indirect questions are presented in Table 3.4. In this table, the indirect negative question 
10 was designed to contradict the indirect positive question 9.1. 
Table 3.4: Indirect and direct questions related to Ostrom condition four (OC4). 
Original OC4 Users share norms of reciprocity and trust 
Working 
statement OC4 
Fishers share norms of cooperation and trust 
Direct  
question 
DOC4 
4. The trust among the fishers is… 
1.There is no trust at all 
2.Not good,  
3.Don‟t know 
4.Good,  
5.Very good 
Indirect 
positive  
kQ4  
9. How much do you agree/disagree with each statement? 
9.1. Very often, you do favors for other fishers 
9.2. Most fishers share experiences & knowledge with 
you 
9.3. You trust your community neighbors and fishers 
9.4. You trust the fishers of other communities 
 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
negative  
- 4Q  
10. How much do you agree/disagree with? 
10.1. Doing a favor among fishers is something very rare 
to see 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
 
The OC5, Users face low cost of information, transformation and enforcement. 
This condition analyzes the fisher‟s opinion with regard to the cost of monitoring and 
enforcement, a crucial characteristic to reach self governance. To modify OC5 we study 
two parts of the condition. First, for “transformation” we indicate a way to use the 
information to monitor and enforce the fishing rules. Second, we add to get information 
and delete “of.” Thus, OC5 becomes “users” faces low cost to get information for the 
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monitoring and enforcement. The questions to evaluate OC5 are presented in Table 3.5. 
Here, the indirect negative question 12 was designed to contradict the question 11.2. 
Table 3.5: Indirect and direct questions related to Ostrom condition five (OC5). 
Original OC5 Users face low cost of information, transformation and enforcement 
Working 
statement OC5 
Fishers face low cost getting information to monitor and enforce the rules 
Direct 
question 
.DOC5 
5. Monitoring if fishers follow the fishing rules is? 
1.Very expensive 
2.Expensive,  
3.Don‟t know  
4.Cheap,    
5.Very Cheap 
Indirect 
positive  
kQ5  
11. How much do you agree/disagree with each statement? 
11.1. If you violate a rule, you have fear of being punished 
11.2. You can easily see how other fishers harvest  
11.3. In a cooperative agreement (e.g. no fishing bass). It‟s 
easy to see if fishers obey the agreement 
11.4. It is easy to detect if outsider fishers are fishing 
 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
negative  
- 5Q  
12. How much do you agree/disagree with the statement? 
12.1. If a fisher harvests a lot, the other fishers hardly 
know it? 
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
 
The OC6, Users group is small and stable looks at the fisher‟s judgment with 
regard to the number of users group along the time. The OC6 does not require any 
modification but the challenge is to assess the stability of the group size. The problem is 
that it is hard to assess stability without a specific time frame. We take a period of five 
years to assess OC6. By adding the time frame, this condition will be: “Users” group has 
been small and stable during the last 5 years. Table 3.6 presents the questions; we only 
use one indirect question to assess OC6. Before the survey it was expected that this 
condition could be assessed with records of the cooperative members. Unfortunately, 
there is not a reliable record on the number of fishers during the last five years in the 
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reservoir. Hence we had no choice but to ask for the fishers‟ perceptions. The - 6Q
question was designed to contradict the indirect positive question 13.1. 
Table 3.6: Indirect and direct questions related to Ostrom condition six (OC6). 
Original OC6 Users group is small and stable 
Working 
statement OC6 
Fishers group in LCR have been small and stable in the last 5 years 
Direct 
question 
DOC6 
6. On last 5 years, the number of fishers has… 
1.Increased a lot 
2.Increased   
3.No change 
4.Decreased   
5.Decreased a lot 
Indirect 
positive   
kQ6  
13. How much do you agree/disagree with the statement? 
13.1. 5 years ago, the reservoir had more fishers than it 
has today 
1.Strongly disagree,  
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know,  
4 Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
Indirect 
negative   
- 6Q  
14. How much do you agree/disagree with the statement? 
14.1. The lake never had so many fishers as it has today 
 
1.Strongly disagree, 
2.Disagree,  
3.Don‟t know, 
4.Agree,  
5.Strongly agree 
 
Data aggregation 
This section explains how responses to indirect positive questions of Tables 3.1 
to 3.6 were aggregated to derive the indices
j
iOC

. The first step in aggregation was to 
ensure that the answers had the same scale and that they have the same response 
direction, i.e. a scale from 1 to 5 with the level of agreement with SGM growing for 
higher numbers. As it was explained before, the answers to the questions indicated with 
*‟s in OC1 and OC2 were rescaled so that all responses have the same direction. Further, 
reliability and validity concepts were used in order to achieve scientifically acceptable 
results. 
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 Validity and reliability 
Internal validity and reliability of the data are important because they are 
together at the core of what is accepted as scientific evidence. Reliability has to do with 
the quality of measurement. A measure is reliable if it would give us the same result over 
and over again. Internal validity refers to the validity of inferences (Russell 2006), and it 
holds if a causal relation between two variables -If X, then Y- is properly demonstrated 
(Jimenez-Buedo and Miller 2009). It is more related to the cause-effect of the variables. 
Validity is analogous to accuracy while reliability is analogous to precision. If a measure 
is not reliable, it cannot be valid. Reliability however, is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for validity (Jimenez-Buedo and Miller 2009; Russell 2006).   
In this research, reliability was useful to eliminate inconsistent answers and get a 
reduced set of 74 observations. Validity was useful to derive a consistent 
j
iOC

 index. 
 Reliability 
Reliability is the consistency of either a set of measurements or of a measuring 
instrument (Jimenez-Buedo and Miller 2009; Russell 2006). Classical theory defines 
reliability as the ratio of the true score variation and the observed score variation, but 
given the difficulties to calculate the true score, different methods have been proposed to 
test reliability (Cortina 1993). Here we use the following to test for a j
th
 respondent‟s 
reliability.  If the answer (- ijq ) to the question - iQ  (indirect negative), is positively 
correlated with his answer (
k
ijq ) corresponding to the question 
k
iQ  (the k
th
 indirect 
positive), then reliability fails.  
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The correlation between - ijq  and 
k
ijq  for each condition i
th
, used to check 
reliability is presented in Table 3.4. Looking the second row (the raw data, n=111), most 
of the correlation values are negative, yet some are close to zero and correlation in 
condition six is actually positive, indicating the need for a close check of reliability.  
To improve reliability, we eliminate observations by dropping fishers who gave 
inconsistent answers. For example, for OC3 each respondent was asked: How satisfied 
are you working as a fisher? And then also asked whether he agreed with the statement: I 
would like to stop fishing if I find a job with the same salary. Reliability would be 
satisfied if the respondent gave an answer of 4 to the first question and 2 to the second. If 
both question have 2 (or 4), we count this as inconsistent answer.  
Checking every fisher on all OCi, each fisher had a maximum of six chances to 
give a contradictory answer, indicating unreliability. On average each fisher was 
inconsistent in 1.95 OCs. Only a few fishers did not contradict themselves at all while 
others contradicted themselves five times.  
Rounding the average to two, the criteria to eliminate the non reliable 
observations was: If the fisher has more than two contradictory answers, the observation 
is dropped from the analysis.
6
 With this criterion we eliminate 37 individuals and get a 
more reliable data base of 74 observations. The second row (where n=74) of Table 3.7, 
presents the correlations for the revised smaller data set.  Using OC3 as an example, the 
correlation grows from -0.11 to -0.30 and condition OC6 switch signs from 0.06 to -0.12.  
                                                 
6
  In a sort of sensitivity analysis, another option was to use 3 inconsistent answers. That is, if a fisher 
contradicts in more than three OCs, the number of observation dropped is 12 reducing the data to 99 
observations. 
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Table 3.7: Correlation on answers to indirect positive (𝒒𝒊
𝒌) and indirect negative (−𝒒𝒊 ) 
questions, before (n =111) and after (n =74), reliability improvement.  
 - q1 - q2 - q3 - q4 - q5 - q6 
(n = 111): q 
k
i -0.03 -0.18 -0.11 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 
(n = 74): q 
k
i -0.20 -0.51 -0.30 -0.21 -0.21 -0.12 
 
 Validity 
Having revised our data to improve reliability, the next task is to establish a valid 
index 
j
iOC

. Validity in our case would hold if 
j
iOC

implies j
iOC  for all i, j. Recall, we 
seek to aggregate indirect positive questions for each OC to form a set of indices
j
iOC

. 
Since the kiQ  questions were designed to be positively correlated with OCi, the index 
j
iOC

 created using the corresponding answers 
k
ijq  is expected to be correlated with OCi. 
Further, a direct question DOCi
j
 was also designed to be positively correlated with OCi. 
Since 
j
iOC

 and DOCi
j
 are both designed to be positively correlated with OCi, if 
j
iOC

 
and DOCi
j
 are negatively correlated, internal validity does not hold.  
Consider OC4 an example. Summing each fisher‟s answers 
k
jq4  we could form an 
index for condition four.  We propose as a measure of the index‟s validity the extent of 
its positive correlation with the answer to the direct question DOC4
j
. If a positive 
correlation exists, such index for condition four appears to be a good estimator of OC4. 
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Using the data set (n=74), a positive correlation was found
7
 between DOCi
j
 and 
the index formed by adding the fisher‟s answers 
k
ijq . Although the resulting positive 
signs, we detect two problems using this aggregation index. First, the interpretation was 
difficult because we lose the original scale 1 to 5 (i.e. what is the meaning of passing 
from value 14 to value15?). Second, by adding very similar questions some degree of 
collinearity was expected.  
To solve this aggregation problem, answers 
k
ijq  were weighted with the first 
component of a principal component analysis (PCA). PCA
8
 is a statistical technique used 
for data reduction and to learn about the structure of the data (Jolliffe 2002). PCA 
transforms a possibly correlated set of variables into a new set of values of uncorrelated 
variables. This new set of values is called the principal components. Applying PCA we 
can reduce the size of the data since the number of components is less than the number 
of variables. But also, since the transformation captures the variance in a new coordinate 
system, it makes the most of the available information to analyze the structure of the 
data. The first coordinate or first principal component (PC1) captures the greatest 
variance, accounting for as much of the variability in the data as possible. The second 
greatest variance is located in the second coordinate, constrained to be uncorrelated 
(orthogonal) with the first one. The same applies in the third coordinate, and so on, up to 
the last component, which has the smallest variance (Jolliffe 2002; Johnson and Wichern 
2002; Theil 1971).   
                                                 
7
  A similar positive correlation was also found using the full data set (n=111). 
8
  The PCA output estimations and a brief explanation of the PCA procedure is presented in Appendix B. 
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Using the first component (PC1), on every Ostrom condition and summing for 
the k questions we obtain the index jiOC

, as indicated in equations (3.3) and (3.4).  
k
ij
m
k
k
i
j
i qOC *
1
^


          (3.3) 
And  
 

m
k
k
i
k
ik
i
PC
PC
1
1
1
 .        (3.4) 
where i
k
 is the weighting vector so that  𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑘=1 = 1. It is a standardized linear 
combination for every OCi index.  
The resulting aggregation improved the OCs indexes. The correlation between 
j
iOC

and DOCi
j
 practically remains the same comparing a simple average and the 
aggregation after using PC1 (see third and fourth rows in Table 3.8).  
Table 3.8: Correlation on answers to direct Ostrom condition (DOCi) questions and Ostrom 
condition index 𝑂𝐶𝑖
𝑗 , before (simple sum) and after (with PC1), validity improvement. 
 DOC1 DOC2 DOC3 DOC4 DOC5 DOC6 
(n=111) 
j
iOC

 simple sum  0.27 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.06 0.38 
(n=74) 
j
iOC

 simple sum  0.309 0.068 0.441 0.260 0.146 0.461 
(n=74) 
j
iOC

 with PC1  0.309 0.076 0.435 0.215 0.145 0.461 
 
There are several advantages by weighing with the PCA weights 𝑖
𝑘
. First and the 
most important is that, it allows us grouping a set of probably correlated answers derived 
from every Ostrom condition. This weighting makes feasible grouping highly similar 
questions. Second, it allows us to retain an index with a scale 1 to 5, consistent with our 
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Likert scale questions. Third, in the range of 1 to 5, the indices can take on continuous 
values. This change permits, with some caution, the use of the mean and standard 
deviation to analyze our measures of the OCs. Recall, the recommended measure to 
analyze of the Likert scales is the median (Stevens 1946; Mogey 1999). Overall, these 
changes make easy the interpretation of the Likert values and serve as an intermediate 
step in a more complex data analysis (Härdle and Simar 2007; Johnson and Wichern 
2002).  
Finally, as a result of this aggregation we got our final data set containing 74 
measures of the LCR fishers‟ predisposition toward SGM, counted over the six OCs. 
Table B.3 of the Appendix B presents the frequencies of the set of answers that form the 
six OCi indexes.  
Results 
The histograms presented in Figure 3.3 are estimated from the six indexes
j
iOC

. 
With exception of OC6, all of the histograms lie almost entirely between 3 and 5. Recall, 
“don‟t know” is the half way between 2 and 4 only and it is treated as a neutral response. 
Overall, from Figure 3.3 we observe a high predisposition towards SGM. 
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OC1  “Most fishers” conclude they will lose harvest 
if they maintain current rules 
 
 
OC2 “Most fishers” agree with rules that affect 
all fishers similarly 
 
 
OC3  “Most fishers” highly value the benefits derived 
from the fishing and they want to continuo 
 
 
OC4  Fishers share norms of cooperation and 
trust  
 
 
OC5  Fishers face low cost getting info to monitor 
and enforce the rules 
 
OC6  Fishers group in LCR have been small and 
stable  
 
Figure 3.3: Frequencies of the six Ostrom condition (OCi) indexes. 
Note:   1: Strongly disagree,   2: Disagree,   3:Don‟t know,   4: Agree,   5: Strongly agree. 
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The descriptive statistics from the six conditions is presented in Table 3.9. In this 
table, the mean, the mode and the median confirm the high likelihood to adopt the SGM. 
The SGM in the table is the average of all the index values over all the fishers in LCR. 
Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics of Ostrom condition indexes (OCi) and average. 
                                                                                                                                                                     Mean Std Dev. Mode Median Min Max
OC1 index 3.73 0.65 3.50 3.50 2.00 5.00 
OC2 index 4.22 0.37 4.00 4.00 3.40 5.00 
OC3 index 4.20 0.51 4.00 4.26 2.26 5.00 
OC4 index 3.57 0.65 4.00 3.65 1.66 4.72 
OC5 index 4.01 0.47 4.00 4.00 2.90 5.00 
OC6 index 3.12 1.10 4.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 
OCi (average) 3.81 0.28 3.82 3.78 3.25 4.69 
 
The analysis of each condition is derived from the Figure 3.3 and the Table 3.9. 
The OC1, “most fishers” conclude they will lose harvest if they maintain the 
current rules; falls mainly between 3.5 and 4.5 but it is skewed to the left. Overall, the 
distribution indicates that “most of the fishers” agree that the status quo is not serving 
their best interests and will result in falling harvests. Thus, commercial fishers in LCR 
tend to favor the adoption of stricter fishing management rules. 
The condition OC2, “most fishers” agree with rules that affect all fishers 
similarly; evaluates the agreement on a set of rules in general, not a specific set of rules 
that define the SGM. Avoiding the use of specific rules was intentional because such 
rules did not exist at the study site at the time that the survey was conducted. However, it 
is possible to gather information from responses to condition two. Values for OC2 fall 
between 3.5 and 5, but mainly around 4. Overall, most of the fishers in LCR agree with 
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cooperative agreements that equally affect all the fishers. Such rules imply a desire for 
equal treatment and our data may suggest that fishers would accept sacrifice and hard 
work if the rules are accompanied by cooperation.  
In OC3, “most fishers” highly value the benefits derived from the fishing activity, 
hence they want to continue; the value perceived for the fishers could reflect something 
more than just profit. Therefore, the formulated questions opened the possibility of a 
general conception of the benefits. It includes a general frame of values derived from the 
activity. The responses were clear to the questions set; most of the respondents are 
satisfied and proud of being a fisher and most of them want their next generation to be a 
fisher. In Figure 3.3 the responses are concentrated between 4 and 5. The relative 
likelihood that fishers value the benefits derived from the activity is certainly high.  
In condition OC4, fishers share norms of cooperation and trust; notice the word 
“fishers.” It doesn‟t mean a general agreement, but the existence of cooperation and trust 
in the community. The distribution of OC4 falls mainly between 3.5 and 4.5 (Figure 3.3), 
although there are 13 observations with indices around 2 and 3. From the data, we find 
that for the most part the fishers agree that there is an environment of trust, but the data 
suggest that this may be an area of some concern.  If, for an SGM system to succeed 
trust among the fishers must be very strong and universal across the resource users, then 
the responses to this OC would suggest some room for concern.  
For OC5, fishers face low cost getting information to monitor and enforce the 
rules; the distribution centered at 4. Exactly half of the sample falls at 4.  This implies 
that fishers tend to agree that monitoring and enforcing the rules would not be costly; 
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although there is a wide dispersion between 3 and 5. One complication in this regard is 
that currently the monitoring and enforcement cost is close to zero. Thus, they may not 
have a good idea how the cost is.  
Interestingly, the fishers overwhelmingly say that they have a way to punish 
violators of cooperative agreements. They agree that it is easy to detect violators and see 
how much other fishers catch, thus they argue that implementing a monitoring system 
would be easy. Indeed, the fishers have fear of being punished and in El Palmito and Las 
Delicias some fishers had received a social condemnation or disapproval because they 
fished during the closed season. The penalty was exclusion from the fishing cooperative. 
Such nonmonetary punishment seems to work. However, from the interviews with 
leaders in these communities and the president of each fishing cooperatives, such 
penalties have rarely been used and are decided on a case by case basis.  
Finally OC6, fishers group in LCR have been small and stable during the last 5 
years; indicates that the fishers group in the study site is small, but not stable. One single 
question was used to measure this condition and the results were clear on the size, but 
not on stability. The distribution is a bimodal, with roughly the same number of 
observations falling at “agree” as at “disagree.” Further, the records of registered fishers 
in every cooperative are not complete and the leaders recognize the limits to account for 
all current fishers. The complication may be due that the fishers easily rotate from one 
activity to another, especially in Las Delicias and La Victoria where the livestock and 
agricultural activities offer the opportunity of alternative income. In these communities 
the people can be a fisher, but also they can grow corn or emigrate from the region. Most 
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of the young people emigrate to study in the nearby cities or go to work in USA, but 
several of such emigrants may return and work as fishers. 
Under these considerations, maybe the best assessment about stability of LCR 
fishery is that fishers don‟t know. Nearly half of the respondents indicated that they do 
not know if the fishers group has been stable. This is consistent with the dispersion of 
OC4; if a fisher does not even know whether the number of fishers has been stable over 
time, it seems less likely that he would tend to trust the other fishers as a group.  
A general measure for each community is presented in Table 3.10 to compare the 
potential for SGM on every community.  Las Delicias has the largest index, but the 
differences among the three communities is small and all they have an average mean and 
median around 3.8, a high value that favors the likelihood for SGM adoption. 
Table 3.10: Mean and median of Ostrom condition indexes on fishing communities. 
 
Las Delicias El Palmito La Victoria 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
OC1 index 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.4 3.5 
OC2 index 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.0 
OC3 index 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 
OC4 index 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.5 4.0 
OC5 index 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 
OC6 index 3.3 4.0 2.7 2.0 3.5 4.0 
OCi (average) 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 
 
Overall assessment 
Pulling together the six conditions, we have a general assessment of the potential 
for self governance in LCR. Averaging the means yields a global mean of 3.81
9
 on the 
scale of 1 to 5; it means that fishers tend to favor SGM. A composite view of the six 
                                                 
9
  The mode was 3.82 and the median 3.78 
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conditions is offered in Figure 3.4, where a polygon close to the border line indicates a 
high inclination of the fishers toward the adoption of SGM.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: A joint representation of the six Ostrom conditions indexes. 
 
The frequency and distribution of the average OCs shows substantial agreement 
for a likely adoption of self governance but also some areas of concern. The Figure 3.5 
presents a histogram of the fishers‟ averages of the six conditions where the distribution 
is grouped around 3.75, indicating a high potential for SGM.  
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Figure 3.5: Frequencies of Ostrom condition (OCs) average index. 
 
The final assessment is given by the relationship between the potential for SGM 
and the fisher‟s revenue (Figure 3.6). At glance, the correlation is -0.11, negative but not 
statistically significant.
10
 While the fishers‟ revenue increases, the likelihood of adopt 
self governance virtually stay constant, hence there is no relationship. As we will discuss 
more carefully in Chapter V, our data results suggest a relationship where the potential 
for SGM is not related with Hardin‟s (1958) prediction that individual interest and 
community interests tend to be inversely related. 
                                                 
10
  The t-value for the correlation is 0.91. It is not significant at 95% level. Making the same correlation 
test between SGM and the median value, the result was essentially the same. The correlation was -0.13 
and the t-value was 1.15, not significant at 95% of confidence level. 
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Figure 3.6: Relationship between potential for self governance (OCs Avg) and fisher‟s revenue 
at Lázaro Cárdenas reservoir (LCR). 
 
Discussion 
On the assessment of the potential for self governance, three major issues arise. 
First, while this assessment indicates a potential for SGM, it does not indicate a policy 
action or what to do in LCR. This is an assessment on how much the fisher‟s perspective 
might lead to a favorable environment for SGM, but it does not indicate they will adopt 
self governance.  
Certainly, policies may fail because the prospects are not good or because the 
policies are imposed without considering the interests of the stakeholders. In our 
perspective, it is preferred to have an approach to assess ex-ante whether the policy can 
work, rather simply guessing or a forcing the policy. This would save energy, time and 
money, valuable inputs in the policy making process. The advantage of the assessment 
presented in this research is that it is founded on the scientifically developed base of 
-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
- 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 
OCs Avg
Revenue  ($)
 45 
Elinor Ostrom‟s work, widely accepted and used, relevant enough to win the Nobel Prize 
in Economic Sciences 2009. The six characteristics proposed by Ostrom condense the 
observed behavior of the CPR users‟ in a large set of experiences around the globe.  
Second, the method used in this assessment offers a way to evaluate ex-ante the 
potential for SGM. Particularly, Ostrom (1990) highlighted the first five conditions as 
the most appropriate to predict a likely adoption of SGM. Current literature remarks the 
relevance of cooperation and trust but also emphasizes the low cost of monitoring for 
successful self governance (Ostrom 2009; Basurto et al. 2008). 
Clearly, the most significant constraint in this research is the lack of a true 
validity measure. We do not observe ex post whether SGM was successful. Therefore, 
we do not have strong evidence that the answers to six OCs favor SGM or not. Although 
Ostrom and others scholars have studied and expanded in years of analysis the idea of 
predicting outcomes for the management of CPR, we are unaware of any attempt to 
make an ex-ante assessment using the six conditions proposed in 1990. Hence, there has 
not been an opportunity to compare a measure of a community‟s predisposition toward 
SGM and then compare that to the outcome over time, which is what would be needed to 
establish the true validity of such an ex ante measure. In this sense, ex-ante assessments 
like this would be valuable if any time in the future, the SGM is realized. If this is the 
case, we will be able to assess the validity of the theoretical conditions used in this 
research. 
As we mention earlier, the contemporary research about predictions of the CPR 
management can be divided into two main lines. A first line analyze the systems: 
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resource-users-governance as whole (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom 2009); and a second line 
use experiments (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008) but, most of the time focusing on a 
single condition (e.g. cooperation and trust). Further, the previous empirical analysis has 
consistently been ex-post. Maybe the reason of no previous ex-ante analysis has been 
pointed by Ostrom (2005) when she stressed that predicting outcomes when new and 
unfamiliar collective- or constitutional choice-rules are selected is very challenging.  
This lack of a clear test of validity, however, also represents a great opportunity 
for future research. Exploring the individual‟s behavior for a likely adoption of self 
governance brings a broad perspective for future research and at the same time, it may 
be useful for the policy making. Knowing ex-ante the individual predisposition toward 
SGM would make efforts to develop such systems more effective, avoiding a lengthy, 
difficult and costly process. In the end, although challenging, any work devoted to 
understanding and predicting the behavior of individuals is indeed at the heart of 
economic analysis. Social scientists implicitly look for models or theories to predict 
from empirical data (Bessler and Wang 2010). This research fits within this idea. 
There are several other caveats that we should note.  First, as it is expected in ex-
ante analysis, at the moment of the survey we didn‟t have the rules to have a clear idea 
how the SGM will be in LCR. This situation increases the level of uncertainty and may 
affect the responses of the fishers to the survey.  
Another point is that we had a weak measure of condition six. It was assessed by 
only one question.  As we note, it would have been better to check the statistics of 
fishers over time; however such records did not exist. Only anecdotal evidence was 
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available in official publications and no cooperative records could be obtained. The 
opinion of cooperative leaders about this point is also relative. They know the size of the 
group in their communities but they are not clear about the other communities. 
Finally, before trying to apply these results, policy makers need to be careful and 
consider at least three points. First, distinct from policy recommendations that focus on 
actions to be taken by regulators, here we focus on the users of the CPR. Second, when 
defining the rules for self governance, the fishers themselves will have to take the lead to 
propose changes in the management of the fishery. Third, in several cases elsewhere, the 
users have received help from the government officials by giving technical inputs and/or 
speeding and control the early stages of the process (Townsend 2008). In other cases, 
fishers and government share the management. In either case, the key of the successful 
management has been related with a high level of involvement of the users of the CPR. 
Overall and despite these caveats, we do believe that this study highlights 
opportunities to explore new research. We believe that this is the first research that 
assesses the potential for self governance, a first step that highlights the necessity of new 
ex-ante assessments to derive better conclusions for the management of the CPR.  
Final remarks 
This research provides a way to evaluate ex-ante the potential for SGM. Using 
six conditions proposed by Ostrom (1990), we carry out what we believe is the first 
attempt to assess the potential for SGM.  
The results show a predisposition of the fishers for SGM in the study site. The 
average agreement among all fishers is around 77%, a high level along all of the six 
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OCs. The highest agreement was for rules affecting all fishers similarly. The lowest 
agreement was in the size stability of the fishers‟ group. This agreement level was also 
consistent with the additional interviews and opinions of leaders and stakeholders and 
with the agreement among the three fishing communities.  
On the policy making front, these results need a careful consideration. The high 
agreement level does not mean a policy action or a recommendation to adopt the self 
governance in LCR. This is only an evaluation of how much the fisher‟s favor SGM, but 
it does not necessarily indicate they would successfully adopt it.  
Based on the attitudes of CPR users, our evaluation is a step to understand apriori 
whether SGM would be implementable. Replicating this assessment would bring 
opportunities to predict the behavior of individuals towards self governance in other 
CPRs, a desirable situation to get better conclusions and support for the policy making 
process about the potential for SGM. 
This ex-ante assessment would be valuable if any time in the future, the SGM is 
realized. If this is the case, we will be able to assess the validity of the theoretical 
conditions used in this research. 
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CHAPTER IV  
MEASURING TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN A SMALL-SCALE FISHERY 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, we carry out a technical efficiency assessment for a small-scale 
fishery in Mexico. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as the deviation of the firm (i.e. 
fisher) production from the best practice production frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell 
2000). Under TE, fishing production is assumed to be stochastic because the fishing is 
sensitive to random factors like weather and other environmental influences (Squires et 
al. 2003). Analysis of TE of small-scale fisheries is relevant for several reasons. There is 
little information on the small-scale fisheries real contribution to livelihoods and 
economies in developing countries (FAO 2009). The information on small-scale 
artisanal and recreational fisheries is scarcer and harder to track with 12 million fishers 
compared with 0.5 million in industrialized countries (Worm et al. 2009). Indeed, while 
this type of fishery is common in countries like Mexico, there are a limited number of 
analyses assessing their efficiency. These small-scale fisheries have the potential to 
generate significant profits and be more resilient to shocks and crises; two important 
elements to poverty alleviation and food security. But at the same time, small-scale 
fisheries may overexploit stocks, harming the environment and generating only a 
marginal profit level (Gordon 1954; Anderson 1986). 
 Aiming to identify and assess the variables that constrain TE, this research seeks 
to provide information that would help in the development of guidance as how to 
remedy production inefficiencies and provide information to define the strategies to use 
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on the assistance of the fishing communities. Improving TE enhances harvest and can 
contribute to better use and distribution of scarce resources. It may even help to deal 
“partially” with the open access problem, but clearly, the decision maker need to be 
careful because increasing the catch may lead to a probable overexploitation of the 
resource, making the open access problem more severe. Thus, TE output is a partial 
solution subject to the existence of a fishery management institution that procures the 
sustainable use of the fishery. As the fishers become more efficient they provide more 
food and increase their competitiveness representing a way to improve their profit and 
alleviate the poverty. While improving TE is only a part of the puzzle, a comprehensive 
analysis is required to improve the management of the fisheries. 
 As mention in Chapter II, the analysis use data from the Lázaro Cárdenas 
reservoir. The fishery in LCR is mainly conducted by small-scale commercial fishers, 
organized in fishing cooperatives from three communities. These fishers face weak 
governmental regulation. As a result, the lake has been overharvested and used in an 
inefficient way (Tovar et al. 2009). The cooperatives, with minor exceptions, 
commercialize the catch; but they do not cooperate in fisheries management introducing 
a classic common property situation. The fishers in the LCR are very poor and appear to 
be more interested in revenue (catch) than in the long-term productivity. 
 It is desirable to have proficient fishers but, what factors constrain efficiency? 
Aiming to contribute in the knowledge of small-scale fisheries, this study seeks to 
estimate the drivers of TE in LCR. The hypothesis is that fisher skills are the main 
contributors to technical efficiency.  
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 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  First, it presents the 
theoretical background related to TE and gives a brief description of the data and the 
estimation of TE. Our results section confirms that variables related to fisher skills 
contribute to fisher TE. A discussion section follows on the ideas of efficiency and the 
relevance of the TE estimation. Finally, conclusion and extensions are included. 
Literature review  
Measuring technical efficiency  
 Traditional economic analysis has linked efficiency with improvements in 
producer skills; while productivity (output per unit of input) has been associated with 
technological innovations (Fare et al. 1985). Yet, the concept of productivity has 
evolved. Current assessments of agricultural productivity, for example, include 
efficiency and technical change as the two principal components (Fuglie and 
Schimmelpfennig 2010).  
 Entrepreneurial skill is maybe a major reason why production among firms varies 
(Kirkley et al. 1998). But productivity may have a distinct interpretation in the fishery 
and should be studied differently due the open-access nature of fisheries (Jeon et al. 
2006). Considering the need for accurate policy recommendations, it is important to 
separate these two concepts: producer skills and productivity (Fare et al. 1985). This 
separation makes easy the study of contributing factors to efficiency.  
 Variables related to managerial skills may explain TE, but there are few studies 
assessing this relationship in small-scale fisheries and the results are not convincing. 
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Fisher skills are likely to grow with education and fisher experience, variables that allow 
testing the “good captain” hypothesis (Kirkley et al. 1998). Though, there is a little 
empirical evidence about this relationship in small-scale fisheries.  
Most of the previous studies of TE are based in large-scale fisheries and 
developed countries. For example, Pascoe et al. (2001, 2002, 2003) analyzed the Dutch 
beam trawl fleet, fishing in the English Channel and fleet segments in the North Sea.  
Fousekis and Klonaris (2003) studied the trammel netters in Greece.  Del Hoyo et al. 
(2004) estimated the TE in the purse-seine fishery of the Gulf of Cadiz, Spain.  Alvarez 
and Schmidt (2006) examined the hake fishery in Northern Spain.  Coglan and Pascoe 
(2007) worked with a set of UK trawlers operating in the English Channel.  Madau 
(2009) explored the TE of small-scale fisheries in the Northwest Sardinian fleet in Italy; 
and Oliveira et al. (2010) inspected the commercial dredge fleet operating along the 
south coast of Portugal.  Some studies in Java (Jeon et al. 2006), Iran (Esmaeili 2006), 
Nigeria (Akanni 2008, 2010) and Tanzania (Lokina 2009) reveal some relationships of 
TE in developing countries. 
Overall, empirical evidence indicates some factors related to TE. Vessel age or 
fleet condition reduces efficiency (Pascoe et al. 2001; Pascoe and Cogan 2002; Del 
Hoyo 2004). Factors positively related with an increasing efficiency, besides education 
and fisher experience, are vessel size, (Pascoe et al. 2001; Del Hoyo et al. 2004; 
Esmaeili 2006; Maravelias 2008), technology advances such as GPS (Esmaeili 2006), 
and seasonality (Jeon et al. 2006). Indeed, there would be the case that luck is more 
important than TE to explaining catches, as it was argued by Alvarez and Schmidt 
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(2006).  Factors like fishing area restrictions, gear and catch restrictions have been found 
to have a positive, negative, or no significant effect. 
Some studies have found correlation between TE and variables like education 
and fisher experience. Esmaeili (2006) suggest a positive relationship between these 
variables and TE in Iranian fishery, a mixed large-scale fishery. Coglan and Pascoe 
(2007), working with UK trawlers operating in the English Channel, showed that 
productivity improvements resulting from increased education and training could exceed 
those from improvements in technological adoption. Akanni (2008, 2010) analyzing a 
mixed-scale and artisanal fishery in Nigeria revealed that TE can be improved through a 
better education and timely provision of credit. Grafton et al. (2000) find a positive 
effect of labor on efficiency of small vessels in British Columbia halibut fishery, but the 
model did not disaggregate the skills component of labor. Squires et al. (2003) measured 
the effect of vessel-skipper characteristics on the fishing fleet of Malaysia, desegregating 
education and fisher experience. Though the estimated parameters, comparing two 
fishing communities, the resulting signs and significance of were not consistent. For 
example, the fishing experience in the west coast region had a positive but not 
significant effect on the fisher‟s TE, while it was negative and significant on the east 
coast region. The variable named education showed the same irregularity pattern. 
Overall, while there has been substantial research on TE in fisheries, there 
remain important areas for further investigation.  Specially, there is need for a better 
picture of efficiency in small-scale semi-artisanal fisheries operating in developing 
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countries. This chapter helps to fill that gap in the literature. Improving knowledge 
would help to accurate the fisheries policy. 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis: The efficiency analysis 
The computational method to estimate the efficiency of each fisher is Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA). Following the functional form of Battise and Coelli (1995) 
production frontier, this approach groups the efficiency effects in two equations, 
production function and efficiency equation. SFA estimates the production function in a 
stochastic form, allowing for random events that shift the position of fishers in relation 
to a deterministic frontier (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and Van der Broeck 1977). 
Thus, in addition to input factors, the TE model approach permits a comparison of 
individual differences and allows for a flexible specification, including variables like 
fishing experience and education to assess the fisher skills. 
The basic SFA model is 
( , )        it it i it ity f v u  x z       (4.1.a)  
where the function f(.) denotes the theoretical production function determing yit, the 
observed output of the i
th
 individual, i=1,2,3 …N, in period t,  xit is the observed vector 
of inputs and zi represents the suspected predictors of  efficiency. The error term is 
divided in two parts: vit, which captures the stochastic part of the fisher‟s production that 
can be either positive or negative, and uit represents the degree of technical inefficiency, 
which is constrained to be positive if a cost relationship is estimated or negative if a 
production relationship is considered. 
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The SFA model was originally proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) 
and Meeusen and Van der Broeck (1977). By adding a distributional assumption, it is 
possible to obtain an empirically tractable approach. The key assumption is over the 
“composed error,” it, which is the sum of a symmetric, normally distributed random 
term (vit ~ N[0, v
2
]) and the absolute of a normally distributed variable (|uit |   where 
uit ~ N[0, u
2
]). The model is usually specified in natural logs, so inefficiency uit, is a 
percentage deviation of the output, yit from the firm‟s own frontier performance. 
The first step is to estimate the vector of technology parameters β from the 
deterministic part of the equation (4.1.b). This equation is a linear specification of the 
equation (4.1.a) that reflects the maximum amount of output that can be produced using 
a given set of input amounts. This step also produces estimates of u and v, the 
distributional parameters of the error terms in the model 
yit =   xit  +  zi  +  vit    uit       (4.1.b) 
 With β estimates in hand, the second step is to estimate the composed error, 
𝜀 it  =  vit  -  uit  =  yit  -   xit        (4.2)  
Coelli (1996) showed that a 2-step approach, estimating equation (4.1.b) first and 
later equation (4.2), is inconsistent with the assumptions regarding inefficiency effects. 
If we need to estimate uit, not it, a method to disentangle the firm specific heterogeneity 
effects is needed; and a joint estimation procedure may provide efficient estimates. In 
this idea, Battise and Coelli (1995) proposed the efficiency effects frontier procedure in 
which the inefficiency effect (uit) is expressed as an explicit function of a vector of firm-
specific variables and random error. In this approach the allocative efficiency is 
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imposed, the first order condition is removed and panel data is allowed (Coelli 1996). 
This model assumes uit to be independently distributed truncation at zero of N[mit, u
2
] 
distribution; where: 
mit = zitδ,         (4.3) 
where zit is the vector of efficiency predictors and δ is the vector of parameter to 
estimate. With cross section data whit t =1, this model is reduced to a truncated normal 
specification. The main advantage of Battise and Coelli (1995) procedure is that allows 
for single stage estimation and produce efficient estimators by reducing the standard 
error.  
An equivalent expression can be formed in equation (4.4) by taking the exponent 
of equation (4.1.b) with t =1.  
i
v
ii TEexfy
i),(           (4.4) 
where TEi  is the technical efficiency term i
u
e . The dependent variable y and the 
production function variables f(·) are transformed to log values. This is a general 
expression that allows to show how isolating TE we can estimate inefficiencies by 
forming a non nonlinear specification (4.5),  
TEi = yi / f(xi,β)e
vi
 ≤ 1        (4.5)  
In (4.5), as vi is non observable, it can be replaced by 𝜀𝑖 , the composed error. This 
substitution takes E[uit |it] assuming that inputs xi are not correlated with vi. As a result, 
xi and the expected values determine the production frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). Deviations from the deterministic output will occur because of random events and 
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because of TE (ui). While only 𝜀𝑖  is observable, ui is predicted by placing a restriction on 
the distributions of  vi  and  ui.
11
  
The greater the value of ui , the greater the estimated inefficiency for the i
th
 fisher. 
In other words, if a boat is on the deterministic frontier, this means it is technically 
efficient with ui = 0 and 𝜀𝑖   = vi. If there are TE effects, ui>0 and the distribution of 𝜀𝑖  
will have a negative skew (mean < mode and a long tail to the left) and no longer be 
symmetric (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Finally, rewriting from equation (4.3), the TE equation will be 
ui
TE
  =  g ( zi , α ) + ei,         (4.6) 
where zi is a vector of efficiency variables of the fisher i, the term α is a vector of 
parameters to estimate and ei is an error term to be included depending on the estimation 
procedure (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Translog and the Cobb-Douglas 
specifications are widely used to estimate this relationship, but it should be tested to 
decide which one provides a better representation of the data. 
Data 
A detailed description of the survey data is presented in Chapter II of this 
dissertation. Form the data gathered in the fisher‟s survey at LCR, here we use 89 
observations obtained after dropping one outlier
12
  and 21 others because of missing 
values. The variables used in the estimation of the TE are described in Table 4.1.  
                                                 
11 
 Recall, ui is reduced to a truncated normal and vi and ui are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed. 
12
  A test for influential observations was carried out. CooksD and R Studentized<2 showed the existence 
of only one leverage point (Kennedy, 2003) 
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Table 4.1:  Summary statistics of variables used in technical efficiency estimation. 
Variable Variable description Units Avg StdDev Min Max 
y Catch Kg 97.6 142.8 5 920 
r Revenue $000 (pesos) 1.48 1.36 93 8010 
l Labor per boat Hrs/ week 27.9 12.9 3.5 63 
gas Gasoline $ (pesos) 294.4 262.2 0 1,400 
row Rowing  (dummy) 0.17 0.37 0 1 
n Nets in the lake Number 6.7 3.7 0 15 
a Angling  (dummy) 0.14 0.35 0 1 
fex Fisher experience Years 23.9 15.0 1 60 
class Taken a training class (dummy) 0.03 0.18 0 1 
shr Share the boat  (dummy) 0.54 0.50 0 1 
incf Fishing main income  (dummy) 0.73 0.45 0 1 
tb Age of the boat Years 14.9 9.3 0.5 50 
tm Age of the motor Years 11.4 9.2 0.3 35 
bl Boat length Meters 4.26 0.75 2.74 6 
ph Family size Number 4.4 2.3 1 15 
edu Education Years 6.0 2.5 0 12 
 
Describing the variables given in Table 4.1, labor (l) reflects hours worked per 
week and shows an average daily journey into the lake of 4 to 5 hours. Fishers used an 
average of 6.7 nets (n) to fish in the week previous to the interview. The variables 
capturing age of the motor (tm) and age of the boat (tb) capture the technology 
limitations because of age of the capital. Years of fishing experience (fex), education 
(edu) and if the fishers have ever taken a class to learn how to fish (class) are variables 
that may affect the fisher skills. The average fisher experience is high, 24 years, and the 
average of 6 years of education reveals a typical elementary school level. Catch (y), is 
the sum of all harvested species during the previous week of the interview. It is very low 
averaging only 97.6 kilograms per week. Accordingly, revenue (r) is also low. The 
average expenditure on gasoline (gas) in that week was high. Clearly, most of the fishers 
use an old motor, several of them row (row), share their boat (shr), or use angling (a). 
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Beyond the characteristics of a semi-artisanal fishery, sharing the boat, angling or 
rowing would be part of a strategy to minimize the fishing costs.  
Stochastic frontier analysis model 
The empirical model to estimate TE follows Squires et al. (2003) and Grafton et 
al. (2000), using the production frontier approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). 
In fisheries, production is generally assumed to be a function of stock size (which is not 
available in our data), fishing time, and the level of physical inputs employed (Pascoe et 
al. 2003). Labor (number of hours used to fish) in our model can be a measure for 
fishing time. The production function model, after imposing constant returns to scale is 
presented in equation (4.7). Following Grafton et al. (2000), we use a Cobb Douglass 
functional form, 
TE
iiiiii uvfcecly  lnlnlnlnln 3210     (4.7) 
where yi is the output (kg of fish harvested, all species) of the last week. Labor (li) is the 
number of hours worked per fisher in the last week. The effort capacity (eci) is a measure 
of the fishing effort and factor capacity (fci) measures the inputs used in the fishing 
activity. Both eci and fci are formed as linear combinations of other variables to account 
for very different technologies.  Effort capacity captures the energy used to move the 
vessel based on the fisher‟s expenditure on gasoline in the last week and a dummy 
variable if the fisher uses a row boat. Factor capacity is a proxy of capital stock, a 
variable used in the model of Squires et al. (2003); it is a function of the number of nets 
used by the fisher in the last week and a dummy identifying if the fisher angles.  We 
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explain the creation of the weights for eci and fci in the next paragraph. All the variables 
in equation 4.7 are transformed to natural logs.  
Certainly, we may use a model like (4.7) by including the expenditures on gas, 
number of nets, and the two dummies angling and row. However, because we are 
estimating the model in logs, this would require dropping all observations with zero gas 
or zero nets, reducing the sample by about 40%, eliminating most of the observations 
where the fisher‟s angle or row thus it would lead to a biased estimation.  
Our model approach allows for the possibility that any fisher can use motor and 
row and use the net and angling, plausible possibilities detected in the survey.  
Two variables, eci and fci were constructed based on a non linear model (4.8). 
This non linear model estimates the equivalence of the dummy “if the fisher rows” in 
terms of gasoline expenditure; and the equivalence of the dummy “if the fisher angles” 
in terms of number of nets.  
])ln(ln)ln([ln 210 iiiiiii anlrowgasynl    (4.8) 
where “ln” indicates a transformation of the variables to natural logs. Again, yi is the 
output (kg of fish harvested, all species) of the last week. The gasoline expenditure (gasi) 
in the last week and a dummy to identify if the fisher rows (rowi), will form the effort 
capacity. As well, factor capacity (fci) will be formed by the number of nets (ni) used by 
the fisher in the last week and a dummy to identify if the fisher angles (ai). Labor and 
output (l, y) enter like they appear in (4.7); plus the variables are transformed into natural 
logs. The estimation result for (4.8) is presented in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2: Nonlinear regression to estimate effort capacity and factor capacity. 
Variables  Coefficient P-value > |t|  
Constant τ0 0.6387133 
(0.9235062) 
0.491  
Effort capacity (in gasoline expenditure) ψ 0.1783858 
(0.1381035) 
0.200  
Row (equivalency to gasoline expenditure) 
1  89.08926 
(142.6562) 
0.534  
Labor γ 0.4950406 
(0.1697781) 
0.005 *** 
Factor capacity (in number of nets) α 0.5097845 
(0.2034385) 
0.014 ** 
Angling (equivalency to number of nets) 
2  1.090787 
(1.002418) 
0.280  
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and triple asterisk 
(***) denote coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Convergence reached after 12 
iterations. R-squared=0.3664, Adj R-squared=0.3283 Root MSE = 0.744656. 
 
The estimated coefficient values of 1 = 89.089 and 2 = 1.090 roughly mean that 
rowing has an equivalence of 89 pesos of gasoline and angling is equivalent to 1 net. As 
indicated in (4.8), multiplying 1  by row and adding to gas we form the effort capacity 
and multiplying 2  to angling and adding to number of nets used per fisher we form the 
factor capacity.  
The technical efficiency presented in (4.6), is now proposed in equation (4.9), to 
estimate the contribution of various factors to a fisher‟s inefficiency: 
blincfshr
phtmclasstbfexeduu
i
iiiiii
TE
i
987
6543210




  (4.9) 
where ui
TE
 is the level of technical inefficiency for every fisher; edu is the education 
level, or number of years in school; fex is the number of years of fishing experience. The 
variable tb is the time (years) that the fisher has using the boat. Class indicates if the 
fisher‟ have taken a class to improve his fishing techniques. The variable time (years) 
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using the motor (tm) together with tb reflects the state of the fishing capital. The number 
of persons in home (ph) is an assessment of the family size of the fisher. The variable bl 
indicates the size of the boat in meters. The last two variables are dummies to identify if 
the fisher shares the boat (shr), and if fishing is the primary source of income (incf).  
Equation (4.9) has some differences with the Squires et al. (2003) model. The 
purpose is to test if fisher skills are the main driver for TE and Squire‟s purpose was to 
identify the main drivers of efficiency. Thus, edu, fex and class are the main variables to 
test. In the rest of the variables, tm and tb are included to assess the influence of the 
mechanical condition of the fleet. Previous investigations examining large-scale 
fisheries, where the vessels size variation is notorious, have found variable bl to be 
significant influencing TE. The ph and incf are relevant to analyze social conditions of 
the fishers. Having a large family to feed and if fishery is the main source of income, 
may affect TE. We add shr to test if sharing the boat could reduce the TE. While 
sharing, the number of fishing hours may increase, reducing the cost and TE would 
increase. Finally, the model does not include variables like remaining economic life of 
the boat and engine that are included in Squires et al (2003). Such variables are excluded 
because they were deemed unreliable in the data set and are probably not appropriate in 
semi-artisanal fisheries such as the LCR.
13
 
                                                 
13
  Indeed, looking the average age of the boat (~15 years) and motor (~11.5 years), it is highly probable 
that most of the equipment used in LCR is beyond his economic life. 
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Results 
To proceed, we estimate the empirical model and test it for influential values, 
multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity. All the outputs are presented in Appendix C. 
Under the standard procedures (Green 2003; Kennedy 2003), we did not detect 
degrading collinearity.
14
 Evaluating homoscedasticity with the non-constant variance 
score test, we reject the no constant dispersion of residuals. In a global test of production 
function, using a significance level of 0.05, we observe that skewness, kurtosis and 
heteroscedasticity are acceptable assumptions for the model. The estimations output is 
presented in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
In the empirical model, equations 4.7 and 4.9 were jointly regressed using a 
maximum likelihood procedure. This joint estimation allows getting efficient estimates. 
Recall, the first equation (4.7) is a production function with output (yi) on the left hand 
side and labor, effort capacity and factor capacity in the right hand side. The second 
equation (4.9) assesses the technical efficiency. Table 4.3 presents the estimated 
coefficients for these two equations. The estimates were obtained using the program 
Frontier 4.1 written by Coelli and Henningsen (2011) using the statistical package “R.”  
                                                 
14
  The rule of thumb of Belsley, Kuh and Welsch proposed in 1980, estimates the variance inflation factor 
(VIF), condition index (CI) and variance proportions (Green, 2003). This rule examines the "conditioning" 
of the matrix of independent variables. If a "large" CI (>30), is associated a variable having a "large" 
variance decomposition (>0.5), these variables may be presenting a degrading collinearity problem 
(Kennedy, 2003). 
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Table 4.3: Maximum likelihood estimates of technical efficiency empirical model. 
  Estimates Std. Error Signif. 
Production function      
Intercept  0.839 0.656   
ln labor l 0.517 0.159 ** 
ln effort capacity ec 0.203 0.099 * 
ln factor capacity fc 0.417 0.123 *** 
Efficiency variables     
Intercept  3.346 0.924 *** 
Education edu -0.251 0.056 *** 
Fishing experience fex -0.052 0.013 *** 
Training class (D) class -2.867 1.064 ** 
Age of the motor tm 0.060 0.015 *** 
Age of the boat tb -0.024 0.016  
Boat length bl -0.061 0.146  
Family size ph -0.106 0.055 . 
Sharing the boat (D) shr 0.110 0.188  
Income from fishing (D) incf -0.424 0.211 * 
Sigma Sq  0.383 0.057 *** 
Gamma  0.000 0.000 *** 
log likelihood value  -83.58   
Signif. codes:       „***‟ 0.001         „**‟ 0.01         „*‟ 0.05         „.‟ 0.1   
ln means natural logarithm and (D) means dummy  
 
Three tests were performed
15
. The first test was on the functional form of the 
production function. The null hypothesis is that Cobb-Douglas is the appropriate 
functional form. As seen from the output (i) of Table C.2 of Appendix C, the likelihood 
ratio (LR) tests lead to fail to reject Ho. The empirical model favors a Cobb Douglas over 
a Translog specification. The second test was to see whether the TE effects need to be 
included in the model. The null hypothesis is that TE effects are zero. By using a 
generalized LR tests (output ii of Table C.2 in Appendix C), the null hypothesis was 
rejected with 1% of significance, thus ui
TE
 should be included in the model. If no 
significant inefficiency effects then we do not need a stochastic frontier model, but 
                                                 
15
  The tests are presented in the Appendix C 
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rather an augmented production function using an OLS procedure. The estimates of 
sigma square and gamma are significant; it means that the model accounts for noise 
(deviations between the observed and the "fitted" values). A gamma zero or close to zero 
means that inefficiencies are included in the model. Finally, the model was also tested to 
see the distribution of the data in the model. The Ho is that truncated normal is the 
appropriate distribution. From the output (iii) of Table C.2 of Appendix C, the LR tests 
let us to fail to reject Ho, thus the model better support the truncated normal over the 
half normal distribution.  
To clarify the terminology used. The model estimates inefficiencies, a positive 
sign in the efficiency variables regression indicates an increase in the corresponding 
variable leads to an increase in inefficiency (i.e. a decrease in efficiency), and a negative 
sign indicates a decrease in inefficiency (or an efficiency improvement). Because the 
dependent variable in this equation (4.9) comes from the residual part, the marginal 
effect of the estimates does not have a clear or a meaningful interpretation. Hence, in the 
estimates of efficiency we only care about the sign and significance level.  
In the production function variables, labor, effort capacity and factor capacity are 
significant and positive, as expected. A 10% increase in the use of labor will result in an 
increase of 5.2% of catch. As well, a 10% increase in using effort capacity (gas 
expenditure and/or rowing the boat) will result in an increase of 2% of catch. A 10% 
increase in the use of fishing capital (number of nets and/or angling) will result in an 
increase of 4.1% of catch. 
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For our research hypothesis, variables such as education, fishing experience, and 
training (or class taken to improve fishing) have a negative sign. In other words, these 
variables have a positive effect on efficiency. More education, more years of experience 
and more training makes efficiency increase. In the rest of the variables, time using the 
motor has a negative effect on efficiency; and family size and fisher income have a 
significant a positive effect to increase efficiency.  
On the assessment of individual TE, the estimated average was 83.1%. The 
vector of estimates of technical efficiency was bootstrapped to get the standard error 
(0.02315) and a 95% confidence interval (0.786, 0.877).   
Discussion 
By estimating TE we assess variations of the error term. Much of the deviations 
from the mean can be attributed to idiosyncratic variation that is captured in the error 
term. Here, we model the factors may influence TE following the Battise and Coelli 
(1995) production frontier. This approach forms two equations (production function and 
efficiency equation), allowing for: (a) random events that shift the position of fishers in 
relation to a deterministic frontier, (b) a comparison of individual differences and, (c) an 
specification that allow us to include variables like fishing experience and education to 
assess the fisher skills.  
Note this assessment is restricted due to the small data set. The estimated average 
of 83.1% efficiency level is a high when compared to previous studies.  Pascoe and 
Coglan (2002) estimate a technical efficiency in an average of 65%, while Akanni (2008, 
2010) found TE in a in a range of 64.5% to 79.7%. Certainly, there are some differences 
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to account from case to case. Pascoe and Coglan (2002) studied large-scale fishing 
vessels in the English Channel; while Akanni (2008, 2010) analyzed a mixed-scale and 
artisanal fishery in Nigeria. 
Most of the observations lie in the 0.9-1.0 range (Figure 4.1). The graph shows 
that a lot of fishers have an index of efficiency around the frontier. Indeed, 55% of the 
fishers have an estimated efficiency greater of 95%.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Histogram of observed fisher‟s technical efficiencies. 
 
This result might have two different interpretations. On one hand, it may be due 
the restriction of the small data set. Possibly the data are insufficient to assess the TE 
given the small data set and with the relatively homogeneous fleet. In cross section data, 
we cannot distinguish between a bad (good) week and a bad (good) fisher. In an unlucky 
week, one fisher ends up with a very low efficiency measure. Using the harvest of only 
one week may not allow for the natural variation that fishers experience. The consequent 
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recommendation is to use a data set formed with several weeks. On the other hand, it 
could be the case that a lot of these fishers really use their skills wisely and are on the 
efficiency frontier; or it could also be that all of the fishers are “equally” inefficient.  
The estimates of factors that explain the TE in LCR (Table 4.3), are comparable 
with Squires et al. (2003), Esmaeili (2006) and Akanni (2008, 2010). Recall, our 
research hypothesis is that fisher skills (education, fisher experience, and training) have 
a positive influence on technical efficiency. We find that fisher experience and education 
were significant, the same result that Esmaeili found in Iran. As well, Akanni (2008, 
2010) found a positive relationship between education and TE in Nigeria. Squires‟ 
results were mixed: fishing experience was significant but education was significant in 
only one regional assessment. Overall, our results indicate that fishing experience and 
years of school have a positive effect on the fisher‟s efficiency. Fishers have an average 
experience of 24 years, being the most significant variable at 0.001 level. The qualitative 
variable class was also significant, although a very small portion or the fishers (3%) in 
LCR have received training.  
A brief comment is needed for the variables, age of the motor, tm, family size, 
ph, and the variable income from fishing, incf. These three variables were found to have 
a statistically significant correlation with TE and the results are in line with previous 
findings. Fishing technology is relevant in the TE and a positive sign indicates a 
relationship where old technology (i.e. motor, boat), decrease the efficiency (Pascoe et 
al. 2001; Pascoe and Cogan 2002; Del Hoyo 2004). Squires et al. (2003) used the 
variable remaining economic life of engine, instead of time using the motor, and 
 69 
reported inconsistencies in the sign and significance. The “family size” increases the 
fisher efficiency (Squires et al. 2003). The positive effect may be because a large family 
may provide more flexibility to how long and when to fish, and allow family members to 
work more cooperatively and exert greater effort when fishing. Alternatively, a big 
family may urge the fisher to be more efficient to bring more food or money to home. 
Last, if the fisher income is mainly derived from the fishing activity, it may increase the 
efficiency of the fisher in the model. If a fisher mainly works fishing, it seems 
reasonable that the fisher will be more efficient; having more experience and incentive to 
get the most out of his fishing. Having a low productivity could lead to a low income. 
The variable size of the boat, relevant in previous studies (Pascoe et al. 2001; Del Hoyo 
et al. 2004; Esmaeili 2006; Maravelias 2008), was not significant.  
In terms of the policy relevance of this estimation, we may argue it on the 
relationships of TE and revenue (Figure 4.2). There is a positive correlation (0.54) 
between efficiency and revenue which is statistically significant.
16
 Hence, the 
enhancement of efficiency obviously matters for the improvement of the fisher‟s 
revenue, a relevant argument for the decision makers. Although this result looks 
obvious
17
, some lessons can be discussed. First, our outcome shows the relevance to 
explore the allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency takes into account revenue, not 
just the output units, to account for the opportunity cost if the inputs. Second, the direct 
relationship between income and efficiency does not necessarily lead to a better policy 
                                                 
16
  The t-value was 4.99 at a 95% of significance level. The t-critical value is 1.99. 
17
  It since revenue is equals price times quantity, and higher efficiency means higher quantity, efficiency 
and revenue will be correlated. 
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making since the fisheries is an open access resource. It means that the policy maker 
needs to have a more comprehensive policy analysis considering the ecological 
conditions of the resource and the institutional rules on the use of the fishery. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Technical efficiency estimates and revenue for the fishers. 
 
Final remarks 
 This chapter presents the results from an estimation of technical efficiency in a 
small-scale and semi-artisanal fishery in Mexico. Consistent with our research 
hypothesis, fisher skills are the most relevant factor that favors efficiency. Other 
variables are consistent with previous findings. 
The results presented are policy relevant. Knowing the factors that constrain or 
favor TE gives guidance for policy makers to consider how efficiency might be 
improved which, if the stock does not decline, would lead to an increase in the fishers‟ 
revenue and hopefully useful in reducing poverty. However, this information should be 
carefully used for the management of the fisheries. Recall, the fishery is a resource 
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classified as open access. Improvements in TE without restrictions on entry may lead to 
a faster collapse of fisher income. Improving the net income of the fishers and avoiding 
the overexploitation of resource stock has been always on the agenda of policy makers, 
and they both need to be tackled. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task. For example, 
restrictions in the open access to control the overexploitation without a correct economic 
assessment (i.e. in the efficiency), could leave inefficient fishers in devastating poverty 
and reach the worst scenario in the fisheries problem of Gordon (1954).  
Measures implemented on the technology side partially solve the open access 
problem (Grafton 2006; Ostrom 1990). Improving the fishing capital (nets, motors or 
boats) is one policy option derived from this research, but it may be more effective to 
implement a program to, for example, improve the education level of the fishers. This 
research shows one element of the puzzle by emphasizing key variables that improve the 
efficiency and the fishers‟ revenue, but a comprehensive analysis is required to improve 
the management of the fisheries. 
Previous research has emphasized the relevance of technology and fisher‟s skills 
to improve the management of the fishery (Salas 2007; Hilborn 2007a; Grafton et al. 
2006; Anderson 1986). This research not only corroborates previous research done for 
large fisheries, but contributes in the knowledge of TE in small-scale fisheries. As 
Squires et al. (2003), Esmaeili (2006), and Akanni (2008, 2010), our assessment have a 
relatively high TE. This finding is interesting to corroborate in future research to see if 
most small-scale fisheries have a similarly high TE. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND THE POTENTIAL 
FOR SELF GOVERNANCE IN THE FISHERY 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the linkage between technical efficiency (TE) and self 
governance for the management of common pool resource (CPR).
18
 As it has been 
documented, due to free access, CPRs are subjected to overuse resulting in degradation 
and poor economic performance, the CPR problem (Ostrom 1990). However, CPR 
problem may reside not only in the unlimited access, but to an ineffective management 
of the CPR (Townsend 1995; Grafton 2006). The typical case is when governmental 
management requires expensive regulatory effort, whereas the agencies often have very 
limited budgets. As a result, the governmental management may work against effective 
management of the fishery, failing to preserve the resource stocks and failing to sustain 
the economic activity, further in some cases, inducing a conflicting relationship between 
fishers and regulatory offices (Townsend 1995; Hilborn 2007a; Grafton et al. 2008).  
Self governance has been recognized as a good option to manage the CPR. In self 
governance, the decision-making responsibility is in the hands of resource users who 
pursue common objectives, increasing the certainty and legitimatization of their 
decisions (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2003). Townsend and Sutton (2008) and Ostrom 
(1990), analyzing a lot of cases around the world, uncovered the characteristic and 
                                                 
18
  The definitions of common pool resource or CPR, governance, self governance and successful self 
governance can be checked in Chapter I. 
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principles of successful regimes. They have shown that under self governance the 
resource degradation and economic viability of the CPR is more likely to improve than 
under regulation by a central governmental authority.
19
 The challenge is to design a 
“management system” that is effective, equitable and efficient (Hanna 1995); effective 
to achieve the objectives, equitable to be fair for all the users and efficient to reach the 
objectives at the minimum cost.  
Certainly, using self governance for the management (SGM) of the CPR, users 
can reach an efficient management system, it means; they can achieve the management 
targets (rules) at minimum cost. Yet, is not clear how efficient management like the one 
derived from SGM is related with the efficiency of the resource users.  
We consider two types of efficiency at user level. The first is the resource 
efficiency. This refers to the rents generated by the fishery taking into account the 
system‟s dynamics.  In theory, resource efficiency is achieved by the “private property 
equilibrium” which has the incentives in place so that the resource is used in a way that 
is biologically sustainable and maximizes the economic returns from the resource 
(Hartwick and Olewiler 1998; Gordon 1954). The second type of efficiency is technical 
efficiency (TE), derived from the maximization of at firm level and described in Chapter 
III. 
Most models that focus on resource efficiency assume that all firms to be 
homogenous in technology, skills, and by extension in efficiency. Our focus on TE 
                                                 
19
  Ostrom (1990) emphatically shows how this empirical result is different to Hardin (1958) who stated 
that users of the CPR will not manage the resource in common because the selfish and egoistic behavior of 
humans. Harding believed that individuals do not take into account consequences of their actions on other 
users, neither in resource conservation; thus all the common resources inevitable be overexploited. 
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relaxes this assumption of homogeneity. Differences in TE across fishers may be 
explained by stochastic conditions (e.g., rain, temperature, etc.) or personal abilities of 
the fishermen. This research uses TE to capture differences between users.  
This chapter takes inputs from previous two chapters and addresses three 
concepts: Fisher TE, self governance, and management of the system. We consider SGM 
as a reasonable option to deal with the CPR problem and we use it as a referent of an 
effective, equitable and efficient management system in the sense of Hanna (1995).  
The specific research question of this chapter is: what is the relationship between 
the support that CPR users might give to the adoption of SGM and the economic 
performance of those individuals? Is efficiency at user level propelling the adoption of 
an efficient management system like SGM? Early assessments of TE had brought useful 
information for the management of the fishery (see literature review of Chapter IV). 
Further, Grafton et al. (2006, 2007) stressed that fisheries management will not be 
complete without discussing two elements: the efficiency at the firm level and the type 
of governance. Specifically, we explore the relationship between conditions proposed by 
Ostrom (OCs) that indicate greater likelihood for the adoption of self governance 
(estimated in Chapter III) and the TE of the CPR users (estimated in Chapter IV). 
If the resource users are not predisposed toward SGM, then efforts to develop 
such a system are likely to be lengthy, difficult, and costly and, in the end, the SGM 
regime may be unsuccessful.  Ideally, decision makers would like to know the likelihood 
that the process will be successful before embarking on a difficult process of helping 
users to adopt SGM. The hypothesis to be tested is that there is a positive relationship 
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between fishers‟ TE and their predisposition for SGM. That is, we are testing if the 
efficiency at the user level tends to favor the adoption of SGM. To my knowledge, this 
relationship has not been assessed.  
As explained in Chapter II, our data come from a survey on the Lázaro Cárdenas 
Reservoir (LCR), a small-scale fishery representative of the inland fisheries of Mexico. 
The fishery exists in an environment of weak regulation and a limited enforcement 
(Tovar et al. 2009). As a result, the lake has been overexploited and the commercial 
fishery is not profitable, clear signs of the CPR problem.  
Our finding is that fishers TE was not found to be statistically significant in 
explaining the predisposition toward SGM. When we look instead at some of the 
variables used to model TE in Chapter IV, several have shown a significant correlation 
with the OCs including fisher experience, family size and the dummy that accounts if the 
fisher income depends only from fishing.  Overall, this assessment contributes to the 
knowledge of variables related the potential for SGM, a useful input to define strategies 
that deal with the CPR problem.  
Literature review 
There is an extensive and varied research on the CPR management. Current 
literature seems to center on the identification of conditions related to a successful 
management of the CPR, while the work devoted to evaluate the drivers for the adoption 
of SGM has been limited. Nonetheless, the theoretical underpinning of such analysis 
does exist. This section focuses the review in some definitions of efficiency, in a number 
of characteristics for the management of the CPR; and in the relationship between 
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fisher‟s efficiency and the management of the fishery. Ultimately, this section reports 
evidences on how efficiency of CPR users influences the potential for SGM.  
We differentiate three types of efficiencies. The first is the efficiency derived 
from the management of the resource, here named as management efficiency. This type 
of efficiency is more related with the cost of controlling the fishing activity (primarily 
transaction costs). In this management efficiency, the target is to reach the management 
objectives at the lowest cost.  
The second efficiency is the resource efficiency. It is related to the sustainable 
rents derived from the fishing harvest, as it was explained by Gordon (1954). Assuming 
full assignation of property rights and a sole owner, Gordon‟s model relates the 
biological nature of the fishing growth with the rent resulting from the fishery. Resource 
efficiency is satisfied if sustainable rents that can be generated from the fishery are 
maximized (Hartwick and Olewiler 1998). However, as shown by Gordon, when there is 
no barrier to entry by other fishers, effort will tend to expand, reducing the rents that the 
resource can generate.  Under certain conditions the rents are eliminated entirely. Hence, 
in an open access fishery, resource efficiency is not achieved. For years, the Gordon 
model has been the standard model used by resource economist to understand the 
fisheries problem. 
The third efficiency is derived as a consequence of the purely maximization 
process of the firm. Here we call technical efficiency or TE. It is more concerned with 
producing at the lowest point on the short run average cost (Fare 1985). Under TE, a 
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CPR user can be considered as a firm that maximizes his output with the available 
resources. A better description of this type of efficiency is presented in Chapter III. 
The last two types of efficiency are not necessarily the same. Resource efficiency 
assumes all firms to be homogenous, using the same technology, the same skills; hence 
all are expected to reach the same efficiency level. Technical efficiency relaxes the 
homogenous efficiency assumption, but does not consider the efficient use of the 
resource. TE only focus on the production function as a general frame, and the 
efficiencies (or inefficiencies) in the production process are explained for stochastic 
conditions like rain, temperature, and skills of the producers.  
In this research we assume that by adopting SGM the users can reach an efficient 
management of a CPR. Adopting SGM may bring effectiveness, equitability and 
efficiency in the sense of Hanna (1995).  
Fisheries management is a system of appropriate rules, implemented with a 
monitoring and enforcement to achieve an outcome. The fisheries management should 
strive to be effective, equitable and efficient; characteristics that are difficult to reach all 
together. According to Hanna (1995), effectiveness is difficult to achieve because of the 
contradiction between short term individual interests and long term sustainability 
objectives. Equity is difficult because the diversity of interest and values involved. 
Finally, resource management efficiency is difficult because of the cost and benefits 
associated with the use of the CPR. Improvements in TE are desirable provided if there 
is a management structure that prevents biological and economic overexploitation of the 
activity (Grafton 2006). 
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The three concepts that are at the core of this research are presented in Figure 
5.1. Changes in individual TE will be correlated with changes in fisheries management 
and with changes governance. For example, when a new rule restricts the gear to be used 
by the fishers, this restriction affects their harvest and thus affects their efficiency. In the 
relationship between self governance and fisheries management (line 1), Ostrom and 
scholars of institutional change school have been working on this issue for a long time as 
it was presented in Chapter III. The research between TE and fisheries management (line 
2), is not in the same proportion than line 1, especially for small-scale fisheries as it was 
presented in Chapter IV. The relationship between technical efficiency and self 
governance (dotted line 3) presents a gap in the research.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Relationship of efficiency, governance and fisheries management. 
 
The idea that a fisher‟s TE may explain the propensity to adopt SGM is 
motivated by previous findings. On one hand, early assessments of fisher TE (presented 
in Chapter IV), had brought useful information to improve fisheries management. On the 
other hand, Grafton et al. (2006, 2007) stressed that fisheries management will not be 
complete without a discussion of efficiency at the firm level and the type of governance. 
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This chapter fills a gap in the literature exploring theis relationship between TE, self 
governance and fisheries management. 
As discussed in Chapter III, Ostrom (1990) proposed six conditions that she 
believed can predict the likelihood of users to adopt changes in the use of the CPR 
(Figure 5.2). In condition five, she argues that a low cost of monitoring and enforcement 
will favor the adoption of SGM. Beyond that, these six conditions do not have an 
identifiable link with efficiency at firm or individual level.  
 
…the likelihood of users to adopt rule changes for the CPR use will be feasible 
if… 
(1) „Most users‟ conclude they will be harmed if they don‟t adopt alternative rules 
(2) „Most users‟ conclude they will be affected similarly by the alternative rules 
(3) „Most users‟ highly value continuing the activity 
(4) Users share norms of reciprocity and trust 
(5) Users face low cost of information, transformation and enforcement 
(6) Users group is small and stable 
(Ostrom,1990, page 211) 
Figure 5.2: Ostrom conditions for the likely adoption of rules on the common pool resource. 
 
Ostrom and colleagues proposed to use the Social Ecological Systems (SES) 
framework
20
 to analyze how easily self governance can be adopted. The SES framework 
has been applied to explain how the rules to self govern the CPR succeed and survive 
over time. Building on the SES framework, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) and Ostrom 
(2009), advised that SGM performance also depends on social performance outcomes 
including efficiency, equity and accountability. However, they refer to the efficiency of 
                                                 
20
  SES was defined in Chapter III as a framework to study the CPR interaction of governance system, 
users, resource system and resource units, to assess how the decision making process is supported to self 
govern the CPR (Anderies et al. 2004; Ostrom 2009; Basurto 2008). 
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the management system rather than the technical efficiency of the users. Their vision of 
efficiency is more an output, a desirable characteristic for the system management, 
rather than an input to describe the management of the CPR. 
An interesting query is why user‟s efficiency is not framed in models to analyze 
the potential for self governance? There is not a clear answer and here we just speculate 
some reasons. First, it may be the case that self governance is conceived as an institution 
that deals more with equity issues (and less with effectiveness and efficiency); if this is 
the case, the derived institution might be a matter of social justice rather than of 
efficiency (Paavola 2006). Second, in a more comprehensive overview, Ostrom (2008) 
believes that conventional economic models may not been able to predict the 
consequences of actions
21
 that CPR users have to take based on a model of maximization 
of short-term individual returns.
22
 Is it the case that the user‟s economic efficiency may 
not be able to explain the consequences of joint management of the CPR? 
Alternatively, in another venue other types of governance had been associated 
with other assessments of TE. We found interesting analysis in governance at corporate-
firm-level. There has been found repeatedly a positive link between TE of the firm and 
governance of the firm (Garcia-Sanchez 2009; Bozec and Dia 2007; Zelenyuk and 
Zheka 2006). While TE of the firm increases, the governance of the firm also improves. 
Here the idea of TE is the same as we explained before, now the individual is the firm. 
                                                 
21
  CPR users must to: (a) expend time and energy to develop rules of SGM; (b) follow such (costly) rules; 
(c) monitor each other; and (d) figure them out how effectively sanction the rules breakers. 
22
  This a reason why Ostrom decided to use the property rights system as a theoretical base to examine 
why some individuals self govern the use of resource over long periods of time while others collapsed. 
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The difference is that governance of the firm depends mainly from the actions of 
shareholders and board of directors. 
Another branch of analysis is the governance at macroeconomic or country level. 
Others have found a positive relationship between TE and governance at country level 
(Meon and Weill 2005; Lio and Hu 2009). As governance of a country improves, gains 
in technical efficiency have been found, but the definition of efficiency is a bit different. 
It is the difference between the observed and the optimal production at national level. It 
can also be assessed with the stochastic frontier analysis, the same theoretical framework 
that we used in Chapter IV. In this level of analysis, the macroeconomic governance is 
close to the idea of organizational democracy (Hanna 1995). The macro governance has 
been assessed as a global index formed by different indicators like rule of law, lack of 
political violence, quality of regulatory framework, efficiency of bureaucracy, control of 
corruption and accountability of political leaders (Meon and Weill 2005).  
Wrapping up, the empirical evidence that relates self governance and economic 
efficiency has been more oriented to explore the CPR management efficiency (cost and 
benefits). The relationship between individual efficiency and SGM represents a gap in 
the CPR literature. Making explicit how TE is related with the potential for self 
governance may give a light in economics side towards the adoption of SGM. 
Data 
As discussed in detail in Chapter II, the data were gathered from the survey on 
the Lázaro Cárdenas Reservoir (LCR). From the 111 surveys completed, we start with 
the data adjusted by validity and reliability, 74 observations. We eliminate observations 
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with missing values and the final data base was reduced to 62 observations. Table 5.1 
describes the variables used in the estimation. 
Table 5.1: Statistics of variables used for the models estimation. 
Variable Variable description Units Avg StdDev Min Max 
OC1 Ostrom condition 1 index 3.7 0.7 2.0 5.0 
OC2 Ostrom condition 2 index 4.2 0.4 3.4 5.0 
OC3 Ostrom condition 3 index 4.2 0.5 2.3 5.0 
OC4 Ostrom condition 4 index 3.6 0.6 1.7 4.7 
OC5 Ostrom condition 5 index 4.0 0.5 2.9 5.0 
OC6 Ostrom condition 6 index 3.1 1.1 1.0 5.0 
SGM Self governance for management index 3.8 0.6 2.2 5.0 
r Revenue dollars 117.4 91.7 11.0 526.2 
TE Technical efficiency index 0.83 0.22 0.15 0.99 
age Age of the fisher years 44.6 2.5 0 12 
edu Education years 6.0 2.5 0 12 
exp Fisher experience years 23.9 15.0 1 60 
coop Worked for cooperative? (dummy) 0.45 0.5 0 1 
catv Worked in conservation activities? (dummy) 0.45 0.5 0 1 
shr Share the boat?  (dummy) 0.54 0.50 0 1 
incf Fishing main income?  (dummy) 0.73 0.45 0 1 
fsize Family size number 4.37 2.3 1 15 
 
In Table 5.1, the catch is the sum of all harvested species per fisher. The six OCi 
indexes are taken from Chapter III and the index for SGM is just the average of the six 
OCi. The average fisher experience is 24 years, though the variance is very high. About 
the half of the fishers share a boat, more than 50% depends mainly from the fishing 
activity. This revenue was estimated using the weighted price per kg of all species 
harvested by the fisher. The income from non related fishing activity is highly relevant 
during the seasonal closure. One third of the fishers obtain remittances from relatives 
living in USA, but 33% of the fishers do not have any other source of income. With 
regard to other economic activities, only 36% complement their income with agriculture 
and livestock and only 4% has a different business activity. 
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Modeling approach 
The main variables used in the model are the six conditions (OCs) proposed by 
Ostrom (1990) and assessed in Chapter III; and in the fisher‟s TE estimated in Chapter 
IV. The OCs assesses the individual predisposition to adopt SGM in a group of CPR 
users. The potential for SGM will be a function of 
j
iOC  for the i
th
 OC, i=1,…, 6; and the 
j
th
 fisher, j=1,…,m. In this chapter we use 
j
iOC

 the index estimated in Chapter III, as a 
proxy for every condition OCi. The proposed relationship between 
j
iOC

 and TE, 
together with other variables is represented in equation (5.1): 
j
iOC

=  f ( rj, TEj, agej, coopj, catvj, Cnj ) + εj
i1
    (5.1) 
where the 
j
iOC

 index response is assumed to be a function of fisher‟s revenue (r), 
technical efficiency (TE), the age of the fisher (age) to assess the effect of experience in 
general and four dummies. Two variables are used as a proxy of cooperation: the fisher 
has worked for the fishing cooperative (coop) and if the fisher has participated in 
conservation activities of the lake (catv). The last two dummies are used to identify the 
fishing communities: Las Delicias (Cn=1) and El Palmito (Cn=2).  
In a modified model, age and TE were replaced with variables that were used in 
Chapter IV to assess technical efficiency. Education (edu) and fisher experience (exp) 
account for the fisher skills. The variable family size (ph) or number of people living in 
home was included to assess a probable social effect of the fisher family. The dummy 
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(incf) indicates if fishery is the main source of income and the dummy (shr) indicates if 
while fishing the fisher shares the boat. These variables are presented in equation (5.2):  
j
iOC

 = f ( rj, eduj, expj, phj, incfj, shrj, coopj, catvj, Cnj ) + εj
i2
  (5.2) 
The two models will offer different insights. Equation (5.1) assesses a direct 
relationship of TE with the potential for SGM. Equation (5.2) explains the potential for 
SGM but now using the variables that explain TE. Both equations seek to account for the 
fisher‟s efficiency, model one is a direct assessment and the second one is an indirect 
estimation. 
Depending on the resulting sign on the coefficients of RHS variables of (5.1) and 
(5.2), we discuss two contradictory theoretical predictions. A negative sign would 
support the Hardin (1968) hypothesis, indicating that self interest of the more efficient 
fishers goes against the likelihood to adoption self governance, they are opposed to the 
common interest of the fishing group. Here is the reflection of Hardin (1968): 
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest is a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. (page 1244) 
An alternative theoretical hypothesis would be supported if the coefficient is 
positive, and more efficient fishers tend to support SGM. A positive correlation would 
indicate that self interests of the more efficient fishers do not necessarily work against 
their propensity to adopt SGM. If they believe in the common work, they would exert a 
leadership for the likely adoption of SGM. In this regards, Ostrom (2009) mentions that  
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“When some users of any type of resource system have entrepreneurial skills 
and are respected as local leaders as a result of prior organization for other 
purposes, self governance is more likely” (page 421). 
Our research hypothesis goes in line with this idea; we expected to find a positive sign 
on TE and in the variables edu and exp.     
Finally, the coefficients may not be significant, a result that may not necessarily 
need to be rare. Ostrom (2008) believed that predicting outcomes in a CPR is extremely 
difficult. Variables like homogeneity, leadership, market integration, etc., are important 
but predict in a model the effect on the likelihood for self governance is too complex.
23
 
“The problem of predicting outcomes is specially challenging when new and unfamiliar 
collective or constitutional-choice rules are selected” (Ostrom 2005, Page 65). 
Additionally there are two groups of variables interesting observe. The first one 
is related with the fisher‟s income like revenue and the variable incf. The second are the 
variables coop, catv and shr; those indicate a level of cooperation and willingness to 
share and work for the community. All these variables are expected to have a positive 
sign. Here we have basically the same argument indicated above for TE. In SGM the 
individuals need to avoid their self interest and share and work in common interest. A 
negative sign therefore would go in line with Hardin (1968), and personal interest will 
oppose to a likely adoption of SGM. If the coefficients are not significant, the expected 
benefits from SGM are not able to predict the potential for SGM or they have an effect 
hard to observe in an ex-ante evaluation as we infer from Ostrom (2008, 2005) thoughts.   
                                                 
23
  Ostrom (2005) stressed the relevance of predict the economic efficiency. However, she was thinking 
economic efficiency as an outcome in the management efficiency. 
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Results 
Several steps were performed before to carrying out the final estimation. To test 
the functional form, every equation was regressed in a Box-Cox
24
 transformation model 
to fit the best response of the data. We find that not all the equations support a log 
transformation model; they did not converge. For this reason, we present two outputs, 
one for the semi log functional form and another for the linear functional form.  
To fit the model, we test different combinations of socioeconomic variables and 
check the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC). The lowest BIC was consistently reached by the semi-log model approach. 
For each model equation, (5.1) and (5.2), we present two specifications: a semi-
log and a linear model. The results are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In Table 5.3 we 
present the regression in which SGM is used as the dependent variable, capturing each 
fisher‟s general propensity toward SGM by averaging across the OCs. Table 5.4 presents 
the results from the seemingly unrelated regression where the six OCs are used as 
dependent variables in a system of equations estimation.  On the functional form, we 
transform in natural logs the dependent variables SGM and OCs, and the revenue and TE 
in the RHS to from the semi-log specification. Following Kennedy (2003), we transform 
only the variables for which percentage changes make sense.
25
  
                                                 
24
  Box-cox assumes there is a value of θ which transforming to normality, gives homogeneous variance, 
and simple model structure. The task is to find “sensible” values of θ by maximum likelihood. The θ=1 
means no transformation or that linear model is supported by the data. The θ=0 indicates that log 
transformation is supported. The θ=-1 indicates that reciprocal transformation is supported. 
25
  Kennedy (2003) on pages 402 and 412 argues to transform the data by using the economic sense. 
“…data for which percentage changes make more sense in the context of the problem you are 
investigating should be logged. Typically wages, income, price index and population figures should be 
logged, but age, years of education and rates of change such as interest rates should not be logged.” 
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A general result, where the dependent variable is the average of the six OCs 
presented in Table 5.2. With exception of the dummy that indicates dependence of the 
income on the fishing activity, the coefficients are not significant. If the fisher‟s income 
depends from fishing, the likelihood to adopt SGM decreases by 0.16 units on the scale 
of the Likert item. Although small, this value rejects our hypothesis and supports the 
idea that personal interests will decrease the likely adoption of SGM.  
Table 5.2: Seemingly unrelated estimates for the Ostrom conditions average. 
  Equation (5.1) Equation (5.2) 
 Variables Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear 
r Revenue -0.008  0.000  -0.007  0.000  
TE Technical efficiency 0.004  -0.066      
age Age fisher 0.000  -0.001      
edu Education     0.002  0.006   
exp Fisher experience     0.000  0.001   
ph Family size     0.001  0.003   
incf Income f/fishing     -0.040  -0.166 * 
shr Sharing boat     -0.001  -0.004   
coop Work cooperative 0.028  0.112   0.019  0.065   
catv Conserv. activity -0.003  -0.016   0.002  0.004   
C1 Las Delicias 0.000  0.003   0.017  0.084   
C2 El Palmito -0.045  -0.176   -0.017  -0.050   
 Constant 1.407 *** 3.941 *** 1.383 *** 3.831 *** 
 R
2
 0.075   0.287   0.075  0.286   
 chi
2
 0.103   0.101   0.128   0.131   
Notes : Signifiance codes:    „***‟ 0.001    „**‟ 0.01    „*‟ 0.05    „.‟ 0.1 
 
Comparing the specification forms, there was no major difference between semi-
log and linear specification outputs in regards of the signs and statistical significances of 
the coefficients. Both specifications did not fit well to explain the OCs (equations 5.1 
and 5.2). The semi-log functional form have smaller AIC and BIC criteria (Appendix D). 
The results for every iOC

 are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In Table 5.3, the 
variable TE related to our research hypothesis, was not significant in any of the outputs 
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of the Equation (5.1). The standard errors of output Tables 5.3 and 5.4 are presented in 
Table D.1 of Appendix D. 
Table 5.3: Seemingly unrelated estimates for the six Ostrom conditions model: Equation (5.1). 
 OC1 index OC2 index OC3 index 
 Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear 
Revenue -0.004   0.000   -0.014   0.000   0.009   0.000   
TE -0.042  -0.418   0.024  0.088   0.012  0.081   
Age fisher 0.000  -0.001   0.000  0.001   0.002  0.005   
Work coop 0.048  0.168   0.000  0.013   0.005  0.018   
Cons. activ. -0.001  0.037   -0.002  -0.030   -0.011  -0.014   
Las Delicias 0.074  0.211   -0.012  -0.049   0.021  0.081   
El Palmito 0.120 * 0.408 * 0.013  0.039   -0.031  -0.135   
Constant 1.243 *** 3.794 *** 1.534 *** 4.147 *** 1.310 *** 3.933 *** 
R2 0.08  0.10   0.04  0.02   0.05  0.06   
chi2 5.68  6.61   2.52  1.51   3.55  3.80   
 OC4 index OC5 index OC6 index 
 Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear 
Revenue -0.004   0.000   0.006   0.000   -0.027   0.000   
TE -0.059  -0.259   0.008  0.067   0.030  -0.003   
Age fisher 0.004 ** 0.012 ** 0.001  0.003   -0.009 *** -0.025 *** 
Work coop 0.015  0.042   0.001  0.018   0.160  0.408   
Cons. activ. 0.024  0.078   -0.048  -0.162   0.019  -0.031   
Las Delicias 0.061  0.157   -0.003  -0.032   -0.151  -0.358   
El Palmito -0.054  -0.136   -0.020  -0.089   -0.434 *** -1.122 *** 
Constant 1.067 *** 3.322 *** 1.331 *** 3.904 *** 1.797 *** 4.604 *** 
R2 0.16  0.16   0.04  0.04   0.24  0.23   
chi2 11.43   12.15   2.90   2.52   20.11   18.83   
Signifiance codes:       „***‟ 0.001         „**‟ 0.01         „*‟ 0.05         „.‟ 0.1          ; TE means technical efficiency 
Condition OC1 : “Most fishers” conclude they will lose harvest if they maintain the current rules  
Condition OC2 : “Most fishers” agree with a set of rules that affect to all users similarly 
Condition OC3 : “Most fishers” highly value the benefits from the fishery and they want to continue doing it 
Condition OC4 : Fishers share norms of cooperation and trust 
Condition OC5 : Fishers faces low cost to monitoring and enforce 
Condition OC6 : Fishers group has been small and stable during the last 5 years 
 
In Table 5.4, the output based on model individual Equation (5.2), fisher 
experience was significant in three conditions of and revenue was significant only for 
condition two. Several variables that one might expect to be important in affecting a 
fisher‟s disposition toward SGM were not significant at all including education, and the 
dummies coop and catv that were included to account a willingness for community 
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work. Unobserved variables may help to explain the LHS variables. Indeed, the R
2
 was 
very small in all the outputs.
26
 
Table 5.4: Seemingly unrelated estimates for the six Ostrom Conditions model: Equation (5.2). 
 OC1 index OC2 index OC3 index 
 Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear 
Revenue 0.001   0.000   -0.032 ** 0.000   -0.016   0.000   
Education 0.011  0.044   -0.006  -0.021   -0.012  -0.047   
Fishr experien 0.000  0.001   0.003 *** 0.011 ** 0.002  0.009   
Age fisher 0.000  0.002   -0.002 ** -0.009 * -0.001  -0.005   
Age motor 0.004  0.011   0.000  0.001   -0.001  -0.003   
Family size -0.004  -0.008   0.008  0.031   0.010  0.041   
Income fish 0.037  0.107   -0.012  -0.080   -0.002  -0.069   
Sharing boat -0.004  -0.010   -0.011  -0.051   0.014  0.033   
Work coop 0.029  0.073   -0.016  -0.072   -0.004  -0.020   
Conserv. activ -0.002  0.036   0.006  -0.011   0.004  0.016   
Las Delicias 0.084  0.291   -0.013  0.011   0.011  0.107   
El Palmito 0.111  0.415   0.019  0.094   -0.030  -0.096   
Constant 1.079 *** 2.907 *** 1.732 *** 4.514 *** 1.586 *** 4.444 *** 
R2 0.12   0.12   0.19   0.14   0.10   0.12   
chi2 9.07   8.64   15.96   10.59   7.47   8.70   
 OC4 index OC5 index OC6 index 
 Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear 
Revenue 0.013   0.000   -0.016   0.000   0.010   0.000   
Education 0.014  0.045   -0.007  -0.032   -0.010  -0.013   
Fishr experien -0.002  -0.005   0.005 *** 0.017 *** -0.008 * -0.015   
Age fisher 0.007 *** 0.019 ** -0.003 ** -0.012 ** -0.005  -0.017   
Age motor -0.001  -0.005   -0.001  -0.003   -0.002  -0.008   
Family size -0.013  -0.033   -0.003  -0.012   -0.005  -0.009   
Income fish. -0.035  -0.080   0.013  0.009   -0.303 *** -0.888 *** 
Sharing boat 0.084 * 0.274 * -0.041  -0.165   -0.010  -0.065   
Work coop 0.025  0.066   -0.021  -0.062   0.197 ** 0.444   
Conserv. activ 0.041  0.147   -0.035  -0.138   0.004  -0.018   
Las Delicias 0.095  0.232   -0.030  -0.092   -0.075  -0.131   
El Palmito -0.017  -0.032   -0.045  -0.159   -0.253 * -0.579   
Constant 0.813 *** 2.548 *** 1.667 *** 4.746 *** 1.735 *** 5.065 *** 
R2 0.25   0.25   0.22   0.20   0.34   0.33   
chi2 21.49   21.65   18.93   17.01   33.48   32.05   
Signifiance codes:       „***‟ 0.001         „**‟ 0.01         „*‟ 0.05         „.‟ 0.1     ; TE means technical efficiency 
 
Discussion 
Overall, our results do not find a statistically significant relationship between the 
OCs and key explanatory variables including TE and fisher education. Fisher experience 
                                                 
26
  For the equations (5.1) and (5.2) we make a sensitivity analysis by running different specifications with 
revenue, technical efficiency and age squared or in a polynomial form. The results did not change while 
none of the variables become significant or had a change in sign. 
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was significant for conditions two, five and six. Although the effect is very small as the 
coefficient is close to zero, the statistical significance does suggest that fishers with more 
experience tend to favor SGM. This results support the hypothesis, that fishers with 
entrepreneurial skills and who are recognized as leaders, may favor the adoption of 
SGM. Although we are cautious in condition six where we observe a negative effect, it is 
because of the bimodal distribution of this condition, and the fact that it is obtained from 
only one question.  
The most relevant socioeconomic variable was the age of the fisher. As the age 
of a fisher increases, his agreement with norms of cooperation and trust also tends to 
increase. Nonetheless, this coefficient is very close to zero, so that holding all else equal, 
a fisher who is 57 years old, older than 75% of the fishers in the survey, would on 
average have a Likert value that is 0.025 points larger than a fisher who is 32 years old, 
younger than 75% of the fishes in the sample, which is a difference less than tenth of 
standard deviation in the SGM value 
Summing up there are several general lessons learned from the regressions. First, 
the proposed models do not explain very much of the variation in the OCs. The semi-log 
specification seems to work better, but does not provide support for either a positive or 
negative hypotheses. Among the variables that explain TE, only fisher experience is 
significant for conditions two, five and six. The fisher income related variables in 
conditions two and six do not support our hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
income and OCs. 
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Additional evidence 
In this section we present additional evidence as to what variables might tend to 
favor SGM success.  As an alternative to OCs, we can consider a measure of leadership. 
Ostrom (2009) and Baland and Platteau (1996) discuss leadership as a probable factor 
that affects the emergency of a new institution. Besides personal criteria, the president of 
the cooperative and the older fishers are individuals in the community that command 
respect by the LCR fishers as it is presented in Figure 5.3. Interestingly from the survey, 
neither the president nor the old fishers are perceived as the more productive fishers. To 
the question, Does the one you follow, catch more than you? Only 31% answered yes; 
and 54% declared that the leader does not catch more that the fisher surveyed. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Answer frequency of the question:  
Who do you follow at the time you vote the agreements in the cooperative? 
 
Finally, in a bivariate representation of the relationship between TE and the 
potential for SGM (Figure 5.4), we average the six OCs to form a global Likert scale of 
the potential for SGM. The correlation between our SGM index and our measure of TE 
was -0.19, it shows a negative relationship, although as seen in the regression results 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Old fishers 
Best friend 
Productive fishers
President Coop 
Own criteria
Other
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(Table 5.4) it is not statistically significant.
27
 This result presents weak evidence in 
support of any relationship between SGM and TE. This finding goes more in line of the 
belief of Ostrom (2008) when she mentioned that independent variables or indicators 
(e.g. TE in this case), would not help to predict the outcomes derived from a complex 
interaction between ecological, social, and economic systems. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Relationship between the potential for self governance (OCs Avg) and fishers‟ 
technical efficiency. 
 
Overall, because of the limited scope of the research and the challenge in an ex-
ante analysis, this research assesses only the predisposition of the fishers toward SGM, 
not their willingness to pay for its adoption. Our OC measures are intended to provide an 
indicator of the probability that self governance could be successfully adopted, not how 
much a person is willing to sacrifice in order to reach the SGM.  
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  The t-value was 1.65. At 95% of confidence level the critical value is 1.99. 
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Final remarks 
This chapter uses the ex-ante assessment of the likelihood of the adoption of self 
governance and our measure of TE from Chapters III and IV of this dissertation to 
explore the relationship between TE and the potential for SGM.  
Overall, our assessment rejects that technical efficiency is related either 
positively or negatively with a predisposition to adopt SGM. Although there is a 
negative relationship between these two variables, it is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, if there is not any effect at all, a fisher‟s TE may not favor or disfavor the 
fisher‟s tendency to support the SGM. 
There is a significant and positive relationship between the potential for SGM, 
fisher experience, and age of the fisher. This supports the idea that entrepreneurial skills 
and leadership may favor the likely adoption of SGM. On the other hand, the 
relationship between fisher income and conditions two and six do not support the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between income and OCs. If this holds generally, it 
could suggest that those with the greatest personal interest (as indicated by their income) 
will oppose the adoption of SGM.  
These findings do offer suggestions for policy making. If policy makers want to 
encourage the adoption of SGM in LCR, it would be a good idea to start the process with 
the more experienced and older fishers and with leaders of the fishing community. El 
Palmito community may be a good place to start the process because it has the higher 
measure of predisposition toward SGM. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
This dissertation addresses the problem of managing a common-pool resource 
(CPR), a small-scale fishery in Mexico that suffers from what we call the CPR problem; 
an over-extraction of fish and a poor level of profitability of the commercial fishery 
(Gordon 1954). The fishers face the problem of how to manage the fishery and improve 
the wellbeing of their fishing community.  
Adoption of self governance for the management (SGM) of this fishery may be a 
reasonable option to deal with the CPR problem. For this study, we apply the theoretical 
framework proposed by Ostrom (1990) to assess the fishers‟ predisposition towards the 
adoption of SGM, and relate this potential with a measure of the fishers‟ economic 
performance. Three main steps were performed. First, an ex-ante assessment of six 
conditions (OCs) related to the likely adoption of SGM. Second, we measure the fishers‟ 
technical efficiency (TE). Third, we explore the relationship between OCs and TE.  
We hypothesized a positive relationship between individual TE and the 
predisposition of fishers to adopt SGM. Economic models often assume all economic 
agents to be homogeneous and fully efficient. This assumption is relaxed and we study 
the fishers‟ TE as a factor that explains the user‟s predisposition towards the adoption of 
self governance.  
We found a high predisposition toward the adoption of SGM (3.81), as well as, 
high level of individual technical efficiency (0.831). Nonetheless, we did not find a 
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statistically significant relationship between TE and the potential for SGM. We did, 
however, find a positive and a significant relationship between fisher experience and the 
potential for SGM. Thus, years of experience working as a fisher would be relevant to 
explain the likelihood for the adoption of SGM in the study site. 
Overall, this research makes two contributions: (a), this is the first known a-
priori evaluation of the potential for SGM; (b), this assesses how technical efficiency of 
CPR users is related with their individual potential for self governance.  
Conclusions 
This research measure a set of proposed conditions (the Ostrom conditions), to 
assess the potential for SGM. Replicating this assessment may bring a better evaluation 
about these conditions and hopefully yield better understanding to support the policy 
making process with regard to SGM. Replications may also help with the most 
significant constraint of this research, the lack of a true validity measure. We do not 
observe ex-post whether SGM was successful. Thus, ex-ante assessments like this would 
be valuable if SGM is attempted and, if so, whether it is successful in the future.  
Certainly, because of the limited scope of the research and the challenge in an ex 
ante analysis, this research assesses only the statistical significance over the potential for 
SGM, not the willingness of the users to sacrifice for its adoption. The high agreement 
level does not mean a policy action or a recommendation to adopt the self governance in 
the Lázaro Cárdenas Reservoir. Carefully, this is only an evaluation of how much the 
fisher‟s favor SGM, but it does not necessarily indicate they have to adopt it.  
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The results on the factors that constrain or favor TE may give some guidance for 
the policy making. For example, policy makers may not want improvements in TE 
without a better management of the fishery (i.e. imposing restrictions in access), because 
it could leave inefficient fishers in devastating poverty and reach the worst scenario 
presented in the fisheries problem of Gordon‟s model. Measures implemented on the 
technology side partially solve the open access problem (Grafton 2006, Ostrom 1990). 
This advice has been on the table for a long time and this research looks for the 
applicability in this small-scale semi-artisanal fishery.  
Overall, fishers‟ TE does not have a significant relationship with the conditions 
proposed to assess the potential for SGM. But according with our findings, if policy 
makers want to encourage the adoption of rules towards the self governance in the study 
site, it would be a good idea to start the process with the more experienced and older 
fishers and with community leaders.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1:  Descriptive statistics of fishing activity in Lázaro Cárdenas Reservoir (LCR): n = 89. 
Variable 
description Unit Avg Var 
Std 
Dev Min Max Delicias Palmito Victoria 
Community # fishers      39 35 15 
Age Years 44.6 259.7 16.1 16 90 42.6 45.8 47.1 
Family size Number 4.4 5.5 2.3 1 15 4.3 4.4 4.5 
People < 15 
years old 
Number 1.1 1.9 1.4 - 6 1.0 0.9 1.7 
Years of school Years 6.0 6.3 2.5 - 12 6.0 5.6 6.7 
Fisher 
experience 
Years 23.9 223.8 15.0 1 60 20.7 27.4 24.4 
Labor Hrs/week 26.7 194.2 13.9 - 63 20.3 36.1 22.0 
Catch Jan 
(p/week) 
Kg 153.1 46,371 215.3 - 1,150 151.3 170.0 119.7 
Revenue Jan 
(p/week) 
$000 2.9 12,436 3.5 - 19 2.7 3.0 3.2 
Catch last week Kg 92.3 19,759 140.6 - 920 61.1 137.9 69.7 
Revenue last 
week 
$000 1.4 1,855 1.4 - 8 1.1 1.9 1.0 
Nets used last 
week 
# nets 6.6 13.6 3.7 - 15 6.5 7.4 4.9 
Days fishing  # days 5.7 3.0 1.7 - 7 5.4 6.0 6.1 
Gas cost  ($ week) 275.8 69,542 263.7 - 1,400 242.3 324.7 251.6 
Boat length Mt 4.3 0.6 0.8 3 6 4.2 4.4 4.2 
Engine power HP 20.0 50.0 7.1 5 48 20.0 21.9 14.1 
Age of the boat Years 14.9 87.0 9.3 1 50 14.0 16.3 14.2 
Age of motor Years 11.4 84.1 9.2 0 35 11.0 11.0 13.7 
Fixed cost $ (,000) 16.0 180,517 13.4 - 64 13.4 19.9 14.0 
Nets cost $ (,000) 1.2 573 0.8 - 3 1.2 1.5 0.8 
Maintenance 
cost 
$ (,000) 0.9 1,933 1.4 - 7 0.8 1.3 0.5 
Number of 
dependents 
# people 3.1 3.4 1.8 - 9 3.0 3.2 2.9 
Income from 
fishing  
$000  0.5-
0.6 
0.8-1 0.2-
0.3 
<0.2 >1.5 0.3-0.4 0.6-0.7 0.4-0.5 
Total income 
last week  
$000 1-2 <1 <1 <1 6-7 <1 1-2 1-2 
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APPENDIX B 
Principal component analysis (PCA). 
Based on Wolfgang and Simar 2007, and Johnson and Wichern 2002. 
 
 
 
  
PCA is a technique that allows us to derive one or more summary measures, the 
principal components (PCs) from the data. Each PC is a weighted average that maximizes the 
explained proportion of the variance in the original data set. Each PC is uncorrelated 
(orthogonal) with the others PCs, in a linear transformation of the data by rotating the vectors 
to get a matrix where its transpose is equal to its inverse. PCA consist of four steps. 
First step, take Xi matrix of n observations (j rows or fishers, where j=1,…,74) 
occurring in m variables (k columns or questions, where k=1,…,m), for any given Ostrom 
condition i. We subtract the column mean 𝜇𝑗  from each observation in Xi to form a new data 
set Ai (nxm).  
The second step is to get the (m x m) variance-covariance matrix of Ai. This new 
matrix is called Vi. 
The third step is to get the eigenvalues (λi) and eigenvectors (
k
i ) of Vi. This step is 
also known as the singular value decomposition of Vi. 
The fourth step is to sort λi and 
k
i . The eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue will 
be the first principal component (or PC1). Ranking all the possible eigenvalues, from the 
highest to the lowest we get the featured vector  𝐹𝑖(𝑝𝑥1)
𝑘  (where k=1,…,m;and p is the number 
of possible eigenvalues), the vector of principal components (
k
i ) for every variable (or 
indirect question 𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ).  
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Table B.1:  Principal component analysis: Rotation: (unrotated = principal). 
 Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Rho 
OC1 Comp1 1.15061 0.301229 0.5753 0.5753 
OC2 Comp1 2.04227 1.10856 0.5106 0.5106 
OC3 Comp1 2.06664 1.16616 0.5167 0.5167 
OC4 Comp1 1.38995 0.472981 0.4633 0.4633 
OC5 Comp1 1.43415 0.253071 0.3585 0.3585 
 
 
Table B.2:  Principal components (eigenvectors). 
 Variable Component 1 Unexplained 
OC1 
qoc1_2 0.7071   0.4247 
qoc1_4 0.7071   0.4247 
OC2 
qoc2_2 0.4077 0.6605 
qoc2_3 0.5873 0.2955 
qoc2_4 0.5913 0.2859 
qoc2_5 0.3730 0.7158 
OC3 
qoc3_1 0.5274 0.4251 
qoc3_2 0.5195 0.4423 
qoc3_3 0.4265 0.6241 
qoc3_4 0.5197 0.4418 
OC4 
qoc4_1 0.4765 0.6844 
qoc4_2 0.6619 0.3911 
qoc4_3 0.5787 0.5345 
OC5 
qoc5_1 0.4381 0.7248 
qoc5_2 0.5089 0.6287 
qoc5_3 0.5508 0.5648 
qoc5_4 0.4957 0.6476 
NOTE: For OC6 there is only one variable, thus PCA I not allowed 
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Table B.3: Indirect questions and frequencies to form the six Ostrom condition (OCi) index. 
 Likert Scale 1 2 3 4 5 
OC1w. “Most users” conclude they will lose harvest if they maintain the current rules 
If the current fishing rules remains for the next year, my 
catch will     (*) 
[1] Increase 
[2] Maybe increase 
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Maybe decrease  
[5] Decrease 
1 
 
6 
 
37 
 
20 
 
10 
 
How much do you agree/disagree with this statement?  
Do you favor the adoption of strict fishery management 
rules? (e.g. stop fishing bass) 
[1] Strongly disagree 
[2] Disagree   
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Agree     
[5] Strongly agree 
1 
 
6 
 
1 
 
48 
 
18 
 
OC2w  “Most users” agree with a set of rules that affect all user s similarly 
How much do you agree/disagree w/each statement? 
…most coop agreements equally affect all fishers? 
[1] Strongly disagree 
[2] Disagree   
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Agree     
[5] Strongly agree 
0 2 0 58 14 
…a good set of rules imply hard work of all the fishers 0 1 0 57 16 
…a good set of rules imply sacrifice of all the fishers 0 0 0 53 21 
…the cooperation among fishers in not important    (*) 1 1 0 49 21 
OC3w  “Most users” highly value the benefits derived from the activity, hence they want  to continue 
How much do you agree/disagree w/each statement? 
…I am very proud of being a fisher  
[1] Strongly disagree 
[2] Disagree   
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Agree     
[5] Strongly agree 
0 3 1 26 44 
…I want my son and my grandson to be a fisher 2 8 8 48 8 
…I teach my son (or will teach if I have one) how to fish 1 1 4 53 15 
…Above all things considered, how satisfied are you 
working as a fisher? 
[1] Nothing Satisfied 
[2] No Satisfied  
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Satisfied 
[5] Very Satisfied 
0 1 2 37 34 
OC4w  Users share norms of cooperation and trust 
How much do you agree/disagree w/each statement? 
…very often, you do favors to other fishers 
 
[1] Strongly disagree 
[2] Disagree   
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Agree     
[5] Strongly agree 
0 6 0 55 12 
…most fishers share experiences and knowledge to you 3 7 0 51 13 
…you trust your community neighbors and fishers 1 7 1 45 20 
…you trust the fishers of other communities 15 20 0 36 1 
OC5w   Users face low cost getting information to monitor and enforce the rules 
How much do you agree/disagree w/each statement? 
…if you violate a rule, you have fear of being punished 
 
[1] Strongly disagree 
[2] Disagree   
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Agree     
[5] Strongly agree 
0 5 1 53 15 
…you can easily see how other fisher‟s harvest 0 1 0 57 16 
…in a cooperative agreement (e.g. stop fishing bass), it is 
easy to see if fishers obey such agreement 
2 9 1 47 15 
…it is easy to detect if outsider fishers are fishing 2 6 0 52 13 
OC6w  “Fishers” group in LCR have been small and stable during the last 5 years 
How much do you agree/disagree with this statement? 
…5 years ago, the reservoir had more fishers than it has 
today 
[1] Strongly disagree 
[2] Disagree   
[3] Don‟t know 
[4] Agree     
[5] Strongly agree 
3 24 14 26 7 
(*) means that the questions scale was sorted (i.e. 2 was converted to 4 and 1 = 5) to have equivalent scale  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1: Testing the linear model assumptions for the production function, Equation (4.7). 
 
 
i.- Collinearity: Variance inflation factors: vif(fit) 
Labor Effort capacity Factor capacity 
1.141 1.114 1.227 
FALSE FALSE FALSE 
Note: Criteria will be sqrt(vif(fit)) > 2 
 
   
ii.- Global test of model assumptions: summary, on 85 degrees of freedom 
 Estimates P-value > |t|  
Intercept 0.535  
(0.728) 
0.465  
Labor 0.501  
(0.163) 
0.003 ** 
Effort capacity 0.179  
(0.115) 
0.123  
Factor capacity 0.548  
(0.139) 
0.000 *** 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and triple asterisk (***) 
denote coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Residuals: Median = 0.03029, Residual 
standard error: 0.7363. Multiple R-squared: 0.3657, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3433. F-statistic: 16.33 on 3 and 
85 DF,  p-value: 1.814e-08  
 
 
iii. Assessment of the linear model assumptions using the global test on 4 df 
 Value p-value  Decision 
Global Stat 1.644879 0.8007 Assumptions acceptable 
Skewness 0.096928 0.7555 Assumptions acceptable 
Kurtosis 0.000432 0.9834 Assumptions acceptable 
Heteroscedasticity 0.162792 0.6866 Assumptions acceptable 
Level of Significance =  0.05 
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Table C.2: Testing Technical Efficiency Frontier approach. 
Tastings of the model, Equations (4.7) and (4.9).  
 
 
i. Functional form 
Testing TE affects on a Translog model to a corresponding Cobb Douglas model and comparing 
the two models by a Likelihood ratio test 
 Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq) 
Model 1: Cobb Douglas 16 -83.579    
Model 2: Translog 22 -80.700 6 5.7584 0.4508 
Ho: β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 = β9 = 0, i.e. functional form favors a Cobb Douglas over a translog in the empirical model 
 
 
ii. Inefficiency 
Comparing each of the models to a corresponding model without inefficiency by a Likelihood 
ratio test 
 Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq) 
Model 1: OLS (no inefficiency) 5 -96.940    
Model 2: Efficiency effects frontier (EEF)  16 -83.579 11 26.721 0.003095 ** 
Ho: σu
2=0, γ =  0, i.e. the systematic and random TE effects are zero, hence, neither the constant nor the inefficiency 
effects are at all necessary in the model. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and triple asterisk (***) denote 
coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
iii. Distribution 
Comparing a restricted model with truncated normal distribution Vs Unrestricted model with 
half-normal z distribution by a Likelihood ratio test 
 Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq) 
Model 1: truncated normal 7 -95.801    
Model 2: half-normal 6 -95.817 -1 0.0311 0.86 
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APPENDIX D 
Table D.1: Standard error of the estimates for the six Ostrom Conditions (OCs) model. 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression, iterated STANDART ERRORS 62 Observations, 7 parameters
Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear
Revenue 0.036 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.013 0.000
Technical Effciency 0.072 0.415 0.030 0.228 0.048 0.311 0.076 0.395 0.045 0.300 0.132 0.627 0.044 1.020
Age fisher 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.014
Work coop 0.057 0.194 0.024 0.107 0.038 0.145 0.061 0.185 0.036 0.141 0.106 0.294 0.021 0.478
Cons. Activity 0.054 0.181 0.023 0.099 0.036 0.135 0.058 0.172 0.034 0.131 0.101 0.273 0.020 0.444
Las Delicias 0.069 0.234 0.029 0.128 0.046 0.175 0.073 0.223 0.043 0.169 0.128 0.353 0.025 0.575
El Palmito 0.070 0.244 0.030 0.134 0.047 0.183 0.075 0.232 0.044 0.177 0.130 0.369 0.026 0.600
Constant 0.281 0.456 0.119 0.250 0.188 0.341 0.298 0.434 0.176 0.330 0.520 0.689 0.097 1.121
RMSE 0.191 0.654 0.081 0.359 0.128 0.490 0.203 0.623 0.120 0.473 0.355 0.988 0.070 1.608
R2 0.084 0.096 0.039 0.024 0.054 0.058 0.156 0.164 0.045 0.039 0.245 0.233 0.105 0.101
chi2 5.68 6.61 2.52 1.51 3.55 3.80 11.43 12.15 2.90 2.52 20.11 18.83 7.240 7.000
P 0.578 0.471 0.925 0.982 0.830 0.803 0.121 0.096 0.894 0.926 0.005 0.009 0.404 0.429
AIC -254.4 681.0
BIC -152.3 783.1
Seemingly unrelated regression, iterated STANDART ERRORS 66 Observations, 12 parameters
Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear
Revenue 0.032 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.012 0.000
Education 0.013 0.045 0.006 0.025 0.009 0.035 0.013 0.041 0.008 0.030 0.024 0.066 0.005 0.112
Fisher experience 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.001 0.021
Age motor 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.001 0.022
Family size 0.011 0.038 0.005 0.021 0.008 0.030 0.011 0.035 0.006 0.026 0.020 0.056 0.004 0.094
Income f/fishing 0.064 0.219 0.027 0.122 0.045 0.169 0.065 0.200 0.037 0.147 0.114 0.318 0.024 0.540
Sharing boat 0.049 0.170 0.021 0.094 0.034 0.131 0.050 0.155 0.029 0.114 0.088 0.246 0.018 0.418
Work coop 0.055 0.190 0.024 0.106 0.039 0.147 0.056 0.174 0.032 0.128 0.099 0.277 0.020 0.470
Cons. Activity 0.050 0.170 0.021 0.095 0.035 0.131 0.051 0.155 0.029 0.114 0.089 0.247 0.018 0.420
Las Delicias 0.073 0.244 0.031 0.136 0.051 0.189 0.075 0.223 0.043 0.164 0.131 0.354 0.027 0.602
El Palmito 0.077 0.266 0.033 0.148 0.054 0.206 0.078 0.243 0.045 0.179 0.138 0.387 0.028 0.657
Constant 0.304 0.651 0.130 0.363 0.214 0.503 0.311 0.594 0.178 0.437 0.546 0.946 0.113 1.607
RMSE 0.184 0.635 0.078 0.354 0.129 0.491 0.188 0.579 0.107 0.427 0.330 0.923 0.068 1.568
R2 0.121 0.116 0.195 0.138 0.102 0.117 0.246 0.247 0.223 0.205 0.337 0.327 0.144 0.147
chi2 9.07 8.64 15.96 10.59 7.47 8.70 21.49 21.65 18.93 17.01 33.48 32.05 11.13 11.36
P 0.697 0.733 0.193 0.565 0.825 0.728 0.044 0.042 0.090 0.149 0.001 0.001 0.518 0.499
AIC -265.1 735.3
BIC 94.3 906.1
Ocs Avg
OC1 OC2 OC3 OC4 OC5 OC6 Ocs Avg
OC1 OC2 OC3 OC4 OC5 OC6
 116 
VITA 
 
 
Name: Sergio Colin Castillo 
Address: Universidad Autonoma Coahuila. Blv Venustiano Carranza s/n.  
 Col. Republica; Saltillo, Coahuila. Mexico. 
 C.P. 25280 
Email Address: scolin_mx@yahoo.com 
 
Education: Ph.D., Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, 2011 
 
  M.S., Applied Economics, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 1994 
 
B.S., Agricultural Economics, Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, 
1990 
 
